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Executive summary 
What is HANCI? 
Following a first phase of research that focused on developing countries, this second phase 
of the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) scrutinises donor government 
commitment to reducing hunger and undernutrition in developing countries. 
The HANCI Donor Index has been created to: 
 rank donor governments on their political commitment to tackling hunger and 
undernutrition in developing countries; 
 measure what donors achieve and where they fail in addressing hunger and 
undernutrition – providing greater transparency and public accountability; 
 praise donor governments where due, and highlight areas for improvement; 
 support civil society to reinforce and stimulate additional commitment towards 
reducing hunger and undernutrition; 
 assess whether improving donor commitment levels leads to a reduction in hunger 
and undernutrition. 
Why measure political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition? 
Globally, levels of hunger and undernutrition remain unacceptably high. 
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent global development challenges. At 
the global level, insufficient progress has been made towards achieving Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) 1. Globally, the number of undernourished people has been static, 
at 870 million, for the past five years, and the prevalence of stunting has remained high in 
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa at around 40 per cent (FAO 2012b). One in eight people 
do not get enough food to be healthy and lead an active life. Undernutrition contributes to the 
deaths of 3.1 million children under five each year – 45 per cent of the global total (Black et 
al. 2013). 
Progress towards reducing hunger and undernutrition has been highly 
variable. 
Many developing countries have benefited from substantial economic growth during the past 
two decades. For growth to have maximum impact, the poor must benefit from the growth 
process, enabling them to use additional income for improving the quantity and quality of 
their diet, and for accessing health and sanitation services, whereas governments need to 
use additional resources for public goods and services to benefit the poor and hungry. Thus, 
economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to rapidly accelerate reduction of 
hunger and malnutrition unless it is equitable (FAO 2012b). 
viii 
A high level of donor commitment is essential to prioritise the fight against 
hunger and malnutrition (FAO 2012b). 
This is because donor countries can have a substantial impact on how the prevalence of 
hunger and undernutrition in poorer countries develops. This influence manifests itself not 
just through overseas aid but also through the consequences of international cooperation 
and domestic trade and environmental policies. 
HANCI has been created with the view that transparency and accessible 
data are key to holding governments to account. 
Monitoring government action empowers people to demand more from their governments. 
With millions of lives at stake, greater public accountability on this key development issue is 
essential. 
The research methodology 
Indicators 
We compared 23 donor countries for their performance on 14 indicators of political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. We looked at two areas of donor 
government action: 
 policies, programmes and legal frameworks; 
 public expenditures. 
The HANCI Donor Index rankings compare countries against one another, using 14 
indicators spanning the dimensions of agriculture and food security, nutrition, climate 
change, gender, and social protection. These broadly assess whether countries: 
 commit to and disburse financial assistance, do so enduringly, and keep in mind their 
capacity to give support and the estimated funds needed to tackle the problems; 
 establish domestic policy action that is coherent with anti-hunger and undernutrition 
objectives of its foreign aid policy (especially in relation to climate change and 
agricultural sector protection); 
 engage in international agreements and treaties that help address hunger and 
undernutrition. 
Critically, the HANCI Donor Index assesses countries’ performance in the light of their ability 
to contribute to reducing hunger and undernutrition in the developing world. The index hence 
puts the absolute size of aid volumes and performance on policy pledges within context: 
those countries with bigger shoulders need to carry a heavier burden. 
Spending indicators include the amount of aid given to agriculture and food security, 
nutrition, social protection and climate change relative to a country’s wealth and to the 
required need. Aid spending is further assessed for its endurance and consistency over the 
past decade, in order to determine which donors ‘stay the course’. Policy, programme and 
legal indicators assess donors’ domestic policy action on climate change, biofuels, and unfair 
protection of the agricultural sector, and assess international collaboration to protect 
biodiversity and to support the international Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement. 
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Figure ES.1 Structure of HANCI for donor countries 
 
 
HANCI measures commitment to reduce hunger and commitment to reduce undernutrition 
separately, because hunger and undernutrition are not the same thing. Hunger is the 
result of an empty stomach, and caused by people having insufficient income or social and 
economic entitlements to access food. Hunger makes people more susceptible to disease 
and thus leads to increased illness and death. Hunger strongly undermines development. To 
‘cope’ with hunger, families can be forced to sell vital assets such as farming tools, often 
perpetuating their vulnerability to hunger. Hunger can mean that children (particularly girls) 
are taken out of school so they can work; it causes communities to migrate away from their 
homes; and, at worst, it leads to permanent destitution, prostitution, and child trafficking. 
Hunger also contributes to the onset of armed conflict (Foresight Project 2011: 3). 
Undernutrition is related to, though subtly different from, hunger. Undernutrition is not only a 
consequence of hunger, but can also exist in the absence of hunger, and can be caused by 
non-food factors. Undernutrition results from both a critical lack of nutrients in people’s diets 
and a weakened immune system. In a vicious cycle, poor nutritional intake can make people 
more susceptible to infectious diseases while exposure to disease can lower people’s 
appetite and nutrient absorption. Undernutrition in the first 1,000 days of a child’s life (from 
conception until the age of two) has lifelong and largely irreversible impacts because it 
impairs a child’s physical and mental development. Undernutrition increases the risk of 
chronic diseases and premature death in adulthood, and negatively affects people’s lifelong 
ability to learn, be economically productive, earn income and sustain their livelihoods, and 
thus perpetuates poverty. In short, undernutrition undermines all aspects of development. 
Because hunger and nutrition are not the same thing, we investigate both hunger reduction 
commitment and undernutrition reduction commitment using distinct measures. For instance, 
donor governments can financially support childcare and child feeding programmes and 
invest in sanitation: such measures are critical for improving nutrition, though less clearly 
related to hunger. Conversely, emergency food aid or agricultural development programmes 
can help to reduce hunger by increasing food availability, but are often not aimed at 
achieving a balanced diet. By separately analysing nutrition commitment and hunger 
reduction commitment, we identify how donors prioritise action on hunger and/or 
undernutrition. 
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Key findings 
The UK is among the leading countries in the fight against hunger and 
undernutrition 
The United Kingdom (UK) has achieved the highest score out of 23 countries associated with 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for spending, policies 
and treaty commitments that could help to reduce hunger and undernutrition in developing 
countries. Just beating Canada and Denmark, the UK owes its high score in particular to its 
strong performance on policy, programme and legal indicators. It does well on supporting the 
SUN movement and biodiversity protecting agreements, and has relatively low levels of 
protection of domestic agricultural markets. In terms of spending, the UK has a strong record 
delivering on its commitments for nutrition; while its Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
for nutrition has not been the highest, it has been stable and enduring over the past decade. 
However, the UK scores poorly when compared to other countries on several spending 
indicators: its levels of aid funding for agricultural development, food security and climate 
change are comparatively low. 
Canada does well on policies, programmes and legal indicators. It supports the SUN 
movement, does well in terms of low protection of agricultural markets, sets relatively low 
biofuel blending mandates, and is among the top performers in terms of delivering on its 
greenhouse gas emission reduction pledges. Its performance on spending indicators is 
variable. Canada leads in terms of its enduringly stable financial support for agriculture and 
food security over the past decade. It also does fairly well on this for nutrition. However, 
Canada also shows weak spending performance on social protection and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. 
Denmark scores well for spending indicators. It gives a solid performance in terms of 
supporting nutrition (second highest of all countries), and this support is stable and enduring. 
It also invests well in climate change adaptation and mitigation. However, spending support 
for climate change is not entirely coherent with policy action. Denmark does poorly in terms 
of delivering on its greenhouse gas emission reduction pledges, yet is leading on the 
development of domestic climate change adaptation strategies and plans. As a European 
Union (EU) member state, Denmark’s biofuel mandates are among the highest. Denmark is 
a member of the SUN movement and does fairly well in terms of its relatively low protection 
of domestic agricultural markets (within the group of 23 countries) and support for 
biodiversity agreements. 
Germany and Ireland complete the group of countries leading on commitment. Germany 
performs strongly on most policy, programme and legal framework indicators, somewhat 
contrasting with its scores on spending indicators. Ireland gains especially strong scores on 
biodiversity, endorsement of SUN, and is among the top donors investing in social protection. 
Ireland also shows enduring and stable financial support for agriculture and food security. 
xi 
Table ES.1 The HANCI Donor Index: scores, rankings and country 
groupings 
 Hunger and 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Index Score 
Hunger 
Reduction 
Commitment 
Score 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Score 
Hunger and 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Index Rank 
Hunger 
Reduction 
Commitment 
Rank 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Rank 
United Kingdom 78 34 44 1 4 1 
Canada 74 36 38 2 2 3 
Denmark 73 32 41 3 6 2 
Germany 65 29 36 4 9 5 
Ireland 61 31 30 5 7 8 
Sweden 59 21 38 6 14 3 
Belgium 58 27 31 7 11 6 
Spain 57 35 22 8 3 13 
Luxembourg 53 26 27 9 12 9 
Finland 52 37 15 10 1 20 
Norway 51 28 23 11 10 11 
France 50 25 25 12 13 10 
Australia 50 34 16 12 4 18 
Switzerland 48 30 18 14 8 15 
Japan 47 16 31 15 18 6 
Netherlands 43 20 23 16 16 11 
New Zealand 37 21 16 17 14 18 
Italy 29 10 19 18 21 14 
United States of 
America 
29 12 17 18 20 17 
Greece 23 5 18 20 23 15 
Portugal 23 10 13 20 21 21 
Austria 23 17 6 20 17 22 
South Korea 22 16 6 23 18 22 
Green = leading on commitment (top 1/3rd) 
Orange = moderate commitment (middle 1/3rd) 
Red = relatively low commitment (bottom 1/3rd) 
Commitment to reducing hunger is not the same as commitment to 
reducing undernutrition 
Several countries score well on commitment to reduce hunger but poorly on commitment to 
reduce undernutrition, and vice versa. For instance, Australia ranks 4th on the Hunger 
Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) but 18th on the Nutrition Commitment Index (NCI); 
Finland is 1st on the HRCI but 20th on the NCI; while Sweden and Japan do much better on 
the NCI (3rd and 6th respectively) than on HRCI (14th and 18th). 
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South Korea, Portugal, Greece and Austria rank lowest on the HANCI 
Donor Index 
South Korea is a relatively new donor. Its spending on hunger and nutrition is relatively low, 
and it is not a member of the SUN movement. However, it does fairly well in terms of offering 
stable and enduring financial support for agriculture and food security, it has relatively low 
biofuel mandates, and is putting policies in place to deal with climate change adaptation. 
While Greece and Portugal are in the throes of prolonged economic downturns and 
extremely vulnerable public finances, Austria is not. Austria invests relatively little in nutrition, 
agriculture and food security, social protection, and climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. Its investments in agriculture, food security and nutrition are not very stable over 
time. In terms of policy, Austrian biofuel mandates are among the highest (as an EU 
member). Austria does, however, do well in terms of relatively low agricultural protection and 
in putting in place strategies and plans to address climate change adaptation. 
Good development partners could do more for hunger and nutrition 
Donors championing the cause of hunger and nutrition are not necessarily the biggest 
spenders. The ten highest HANCI donor rankings are not strongly correlated to the share of 
the gross national income (GNI) given as aid. This also suggests that countries that have a 
relatively good track record on international development like France, Norway, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, who are not in the top ten HANCI rankings, could do more for 
hunger and nutrition. 
1 
1 Introduction 
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent global development challenges. At 
the global level, insufficient progress has been made towards achieving Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) 1. At the global level, the number of undernourished people has 
been static at 870 million for the past five years, and the prevalence of stunting has remained 
high in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa at around 40 per cent (FAO 2012b). 
There are many reasons1 for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and undernutrition. One 
of these is a ‘lack of political will’ or political prioritisation (FAO 2012b: 22). Political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and decisive 
public action, through public policies and programmes, public spending and legislation that 
are designed to tackle these twin problems. 
Hunger and undernutrition reduction are currently on donor agendas. In April 2013, the Irish 
government inaugurated its Presidency of the European Union with the hosting of a 
conference on Hunger, Nutrition and Climate Justice. In June 2013, the British government, 
led by the Prime Minister David Cameron, hosted an event ahead of the G8 summit which 
successfully sought to persuade donor as well as developing countries to make new 
commitments aiming to address hunger and undernutrition and to be accountable for doing 
so. In May 2012, health leaders worldwide adopted the Maternal, Infant and Young Child 
Nutrition Plan at the 65th World Health Assembly, agreeing to commit to reducing the 
number of stunted children in the world by 40 per cent by 2025. Underpinning much of this is 
the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, which seeks to galvanise and guide public and 
private action towards improved nutrition outcomes, especially for the worst off. 
How will we know whether commitments like these are being made, if they will be met, and if 
all countries are pulling their weight? 
The Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) is a new tool to assess the extent of 
government commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. Its objective is to develop a 
credible measure of the commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition to help focus 
support and pressure for change. The measurement of hunger and nutrition outcomes alone 
is not a sufficiently strong accountability mechanism, largely because attribution is difficult. 
There are many factors contributing to hunger and undernutrition outcomes, many of which 
neither recipient nor donor governments can control. However, in the absence of 
transparency and better information on what governments are doing to address the situation, 
it is very difficult to link outcomes with government action or inaction. We thus need to be 
able to track donor governments’ commitment. 
How might measuring political commitment change anything? The theory of change behind 
the HANCI is that: (1) by credibly measuring commitment it will strengthen our ability to hold 
governments to account for their efforts in reducing undernutrition and hunger; (2) if civil 
society is better able to hold governments to account, then it can apply pressure and ensure 
that hunger and undernutrition are put high on development agendas; (3) governments can 
hold themselves to account in their efforts to keep hunger and undernutrition high on the 
                                               
1
 The Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (cited in FAO 2012a) identifies the following causes of hunger 
and malnutrition: ‘lack of good governance to ensure transparency, accountability and rule of law, which underpin access to 
food and higher living standards; lack of high-level political commitment and prioritization of the fight against hunger and 
malnutrition, including failure to fully implement past pledges and commitments and lack of accountability; lack of coherence in 
policymaking within countries, but also globally and regionally; lack of prioritization of policies, plans, programmes and funding 
to tackle hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity, focusing in particular on the most vulnerable and food insecure populations; 
war, conflict, lack of security, political instability and weak institutions; and weak international governance of food security and 
nutrition’. 
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agenda: the index can help them to track and prioritise their efforts because it is constructed 
on the basis of performance in different areas (policy, legal and expenditure); and (4) 
commitment can be linked to outcomes, to allow all to assess the ‘value added’ of different 
commitments and effort. 
Following the recently released HANCI for developing countries (te Lintelo et al. 2013), this 
report presents the HANCI for donor countries. It aims to bring a greater measure of 
transparency and accountability to the functioning of donor countries in supporting 
developing countries to address hunger and undernutrition. The HANCI Donor Index 
uniquely compares 23 donor countries for their relative performance in key areas contributing 
to hunger and undernutrition reduction. It uses 14 commitment indicators assessing donor 
spending and policy choices relating to agriculture, food security, nutrition, social protection, 
gender equity, climate change, and trade. The HANCI is calculated using secondary 
(government-owned) data. The report further presents findings from primary research in four 
donor countries: Germany, Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands.2 
1.1 The HANCI Donor Index: what’s new? 
The HANCI Donor Index substantially builds on (and replaces) the Hunger Reduction 
Commitment Index (HRCI) for donors (te Lintelo et al. 2011), drawing on its theory of change 
and methodology. The HANCI Donor Index also presents several innovations. 
 It consistently applies a fair share approach, to assess countries’ capacity and 
responsibility for providing support. 
 It introduces a new set of indicators across the familiar themes of expenditures, and 
policies, programmes and legal frameworks. 
 It covers a greater range of countries in which primary research is conducted. 
Table 1.1 provides a short overview. 
1.1.1 HANCI dissemination 
If the HANCI Donor Index is to add value by highlighting donors’ successes and deficits in 
commitment to ending hunger and undernutrition, it has to be well known and easy to 
access. We have begun the first phase of setting up mechanisms and channels for outreach 
and have developed a communications plan. 
A new website has been launched (www.hancindex.org). It will be regularly updated to 
provide the latest information on the project and to provide access to relevant background 
papers, presentations, and the latest data. Users interested in the project can subscribe to 
receive updates. The website includes a number of interactive data visualisation applications. 
These present HANCI findings in a number of ways and allow users to interact with and 
explore the underlying data. 
Multimedia products such as an animated film and photo-slideshows have been developed to 
explain the HANCI and reflect the views and experiences of communities most affected by 
hunger and undernutrition. These will also be available on the HANCI website and on 
YouTube (http://youtu.be/PKv6G0Zw4UI), and the animated film has already been 
embedded on various websites of other interested parties. 
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 The report is called the HANCI Donor Index 2012 because all data were collected in 2012. 
3 
Table 1.1 Overview of HANCI Donor Index features compared with the 
HRCI for donor countries 
Features HANCI 2012 HRCI 2011 
Focus Hunger and nutrition commitment 
Themes Public expenditures 
Policies, programmes and legal frameworks 
Secondary data 
 Countries 23 21 
Indicators 14 10 
Index construction 
 Indicator values aggregated Normalised values, at theme level 
Ranking scheme Borda 
Primary data 
 Countries The UK 
Ireland 
Germany 
The Netherlands 
The UK 
Experts interviewed  91 26 
Website www.hancindex.org www.hrcindex.org 
The HANCI reports have led to a range of media interviews with the HANCI authors, 
including radio broadcasts with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, 
BBC Radio 5, Radio Moscow, and a feature-length production by Al Jazeera television. The 
reports have also received substantial positive coverage by social media and in the 
blogosphere. Irish and Canadian ministers have commented and tweeted on the index and 
policymakers in Norway and the Netherlands are seeking to improve their rankings on future 
index editions. Annex 1 provides an overview of media coverage of the HANCI Donor Index 
during June 2013. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the HANCI 
methodology, discussing both secondary and primary data collection and use. Chapter 3 
presents the HANCI donor country rankings, based on secondary data analysis. Chapter 4 
discusses the empirical functioning of the index and the findings from a sensitivity analysis. 
Chapter 5 presents findings from primary research for Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and the UK. It is followed by a brief set of conclusions in Chapter 6. 
4 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Building the HANCI Donor Index using secondary data 
Index construction involves decisions about what indicators to include and how to weight 
each. Indices need to be critically evaluated on the following aspects (Ravallion 2010): 
 conceptual clarity; 
 transparency about trade-offs within the index; 
 robustness tests (openness on the quality of data and on the weights used); 
 a critical perspective on policy relevance. 
The following sections reflect on these aspects. We start with a conceptualisation of key 
terms, followed by a discussion of the methodological choices involved in developing the 
HANCI Donor Index based on secondary data. We then reflect on the research methodology 
for the collection and use of primary data. 
2.1.1 Conceptualising political commitment of donor countries 
The concept of political commitment can be broken down into components of government 
action and intention (te Lintelo et al. 2011). The difficulty of identifying and measuring 
intention leads us to focus on government action3 towards hunger reduction and improved 
nutrition. Actions of particular interest concern sustained material, legal and financial efforts 
(The Policy Project 2000). Government action addressing social problems typically takes the 
form of a combination of legislation and policy or programmatic action, with both underpinned 
by public spending. 
Commitment of donors, when assessed, tends to be done from a singular angle focusing on 
aid spending profiles, as for instance demonstrated by recent assessments of nutrition 
commitment (Coppard and Zubairi 2011; Mutuma 2012; Di Ciommo 2013). Others combine 
this with attempts to assess the quality of donor–recipient relations (ONE 2013). The HANCI 
Donor Index is inspired by the approach of the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) 
(Roodman 2012), which critically assesses the coherence of donor policy in and beyond the 
realm of aid. Accordingly, the HANCI Donor Index interrogates donors’ aid profiles and 
assesses domestic policy choices and engagements in international legal agreements that 
have a bearing on hunger and nutrition outcomes in developing countries. The HANCI Donor 
Index contains indicators on two themes: (1) public spending, and (2) policies, programmes 
and legal frameworks. 
How do we apply these themes to hunger and undernutrition? We chose to relate the index 
to the term ‘hunger’ because hunger resonates with non-experts, and the index is designed 
to help those who want to motivate non-experts to put pressure on their governments to act. 
Hunger is the body's way of signalling that it is running short of food and needs to eat 
something. Hunger can lead to malnutrition (SUN 2010). Nevertheless, hunger, 
undernutrition and food insecurity are not the same thing (Foresight Project 2011). For 
example, an individual can be food insecure and suffering from undernutrition, but not 
hungry, because while the quality of his or her diet is poor, the bulk may be sufficient to 
satiate. 
                                               
3
 For the purpose of building an index that compares countries, this project focuses on national-level governments. This 
aggregates political will at a high level and is thus not suitable for identifying differences in commitment at a lower level of 
aggregation, such as across departments or between levels of administration. 
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The operationalisation of the HANCI is informed by definitions of food security and nutrition 
security. ‘Food security exists when all people at all times have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life’ (CFS 2009). A broad interpretation of this definition 
recognises that individuals’ access to adequate food that fully satisfies nutritional needs must 
be understood in conjunction with non-food factors that enable a person to metabolise their 
food and use the nutrients to support growth, to maintain the body and to carry out basic life 
functions (CFS 2012). The concept of nutrition security makes such aspects more explicit. 
Thus, nutrition security is achieved when secure access to an appropriately nutritious diet is 
coupled with a sanitary environment and adequate health services and care, to ensure a 
healthy and active life for all household members (SUN 2010).4 
Accordingly, the HANCI Donor Index considers how donor countries can undertake action 
relating to key dimensions of food availability, access, stability and utilisation emphasised in 
the food security definition, and also actively seeks to address food, care-related and other 
non-food aspects of nutrition more explicitly identified in the nutrition security definition. 
2.1.2 Indicator and country selection criteria 
The HANCI distinguishes (levels of) political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition from actual hunger and nutrition outcomes. While political commitment should 
drive such lagged outcomes and outcomes should affect commitment in turn, there are many 
other factors that drive hunger and undernutrition. Commitment should therefore not be 
confused with outcomes, and should be measured separately. This general principle was 
applied to assess developing countries’ commitment (te Lintelo et al. 2013), and applies even 
more strongly for donor countries’ commitment. Bilateral donor action will, in most cases, 
only indirectly affect hunger and undernutrition outcomes, as technical and financial aid are 
mediated by the apparatuses of recipient country governments, and increasingly so to 
ensure their ownership. 
Hunger, undernutrition, and the commitment to fighting hunger and undernutrition are 
imprecise concepts and need to be approximated by several variables. We use a theory-
based approach to the selection of the index items and are guided by four general principles. 
First, indicators should cover donor support towards major aspects of efforts to reduce 
hunger and to enhance nutrition: food availability (production and market availability), food 
access (the ability to access and purchase food), and food utilisation (including non-food 
factors affecting individuals’ ability to use food to build and maintain nutrition status and to 
carry out basic life functions). We include a variety of indicators that (1) address only hunger; 
(2) address both hunger and nutrition; and (3) focus only on nutrition (Figure 2.1). For 
instance, donors can provide aid for direction nutrition interventions such as vitamin A 
supplementation programmes, or to indirect nutrition interventions such as improved 
sanitation. However, support for such important nutrition interventions rarely aims to address 
hunger per se. Conversely, emergency food aid can help to reduce hunger, but is often not 
aimed at achieving a balanced diet. 
Second, because ‘malnutrition is often misperceived by policymakers as a basic food 
problem, rather than a complex multisectoral problem’ (Headey 2011: 30), we looked for 
indicators that span the various sectors, including agriculture, food security, nutrition, gender, 
social protection, and trade policy. 
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 At the global level, undernutrition, especially among children, increasingly coexists with overweight and diet-related chronic 
diseases and micronutrient malnutrition. While this double burden of malnutrition is growing (FAO 2012b), the HANCI focuses 
on undernutrition because we are unable to find suitable indicators of political commitment to address over-nutrition for which 
data are available across a wide range of countries. 
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Figure 2.1 Aspects covered by HANCI indicators 
 
Third, we considered how donors support different types of interventions: 
 direct interventions (e.g. ODA to basic nutrition); 
 indirect interventions (e.g. ODA investments in agriculture or sanitation); 
 indicators referring to wider political and financial enabling environments (FAO 
2012b) necessary to sustain progress in tackling global hunger and undernutrition. In 
relation to undernutrition, an ‘enabling environment’ can be defined as the ‘wider 
political and policy processes which build and sustain momentum for the effective 
implementation of actions that reduce undernutrition’ (Gillespie et al. 2013). 
Fourth, we aimed to select indicators that are simple and transparent in order to be easily 
understood by all stakeholders. This principle was, however, sometimes trumped by the 
need for the index to include indicators that express commitment relative to countries’ ability 
to contribute to reducing hunger and undernutrition (and, in the case of climate change, 
historical responsibility for CO2 emissions). In some cases, donor commitments are defined 
against different reporting periods; comparing countries thus involved devising a common 
benchmark, overruling the simplicity principle. 
The process of identifying indicators started with a review of the donor country indicators in 
the HRCI (te Lintelo et al. 2011). It was complemented with a brief literature review on the 
role and performance of donor countries towards addressing hunger and undernutrition. This 
literature is limited and dominated by reports by international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (e.g. ONE 2010; Coppard and Zubairi 2011; Mousseau 2012; Mutuma 
2012; Di Ciommo 2013; ONE 2013). Multilateral agencies such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (Chopra et al. 2009; Engesveen et al. 2009), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (pers comm., Schmidhuber 2012), the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the SUN Secretariat (SUN 2010, 2011; ACF 2012; 
Mannar 2012; SUN 2012b, 2012c) and others (REACH 2012) have begun monitoring 
commitments of aid recipient countries to address hunger and undernutrition. This critical 
gaze has not yet been sufficiently extended to bilateral and multilateral donors and 
philanthropic foundations. 
Having drafted a list of tentative indicators, we operationalised these and consulted hunger 
and nutrition specialists at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) about their suitability. 
Having identified indicators that we would have liked to be included in the HANCI, we 
conducted a desk review to identify data sources, drawing on international databases, 
academic and grey literature and web-based materials. We were also mindful of the quality 
of the data as reported by other analysts (Ravallion 2010) and whether there was sufficient 
variation in indicator scores across countries allowing us to be able to distinguish between 
Hunger Undernutrition
Hunger 
and 
under-
nutrition
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their performances. Annex 2 shows the indicators that we considered including but were 
unable to, and explains why they could not be included (chiefly because of data unavailability 
and lack of variation from year to year). 
The study includes all countries for which the OECD–DAC Creditor Reporting System 
database provides data (see Table 2.1).5 
Table 2.1 Countries included in the HANCI Donor Index 2012 (by 
alphabetical order) 
Australia Denmark Greece Luxembourg Portugal Switzerland 
Austria Finland Ireland Netherlands Spain United Kingdom 
Belgium France Italy New Zealand South Korea United States of 
America Canada Germany Japan Norway Sweden 
2.2 HANCI Donor Index indicators 
This section first provides an overview of the indicators used for constructing the HANCI 
Donor Index (Table 2.2). It is followed by a brief discussion of the logic behind each 
indicator’s selection. 
Table 2.2 HANCI indicators by theme and by type of intervention 
 Expenditures Policies, programmes and legal 
frameworks 
Direct 
interventions 
ODA to nutrition: fair share* 
ODA to nutrition: endurance* 
ODA to nutrition: commitment vs disbursement* 
 
Indirect 
interventions 
ODA to agriculture and food security: fair share
†
 
ODA to agriculture and food security: 
endurance
†
 
Biofuels mandates
†
 
Enabling 
environment 
ODA to social protection: fair share
†
 
ODA to climate change: fair share
†
 
CO2 emission performance
†
 
Gender objectives in ODA
‡
 
SUN membership* 
Protection of domestic agriculture
†
 
Biodiversity
†
 
Climate change adaptation 
strategies/plans
†
 
*Nutrition indicators, 
†
Hunger reduction indicators, 
‡
Hunger and nutrition indicators. 
HANCI Donor Index indicators express donors’ political commitment to reduce (a) hunger 
and (b) undernutrition. They span various dimensions, including agriculture and food 
security, nutrition, climate change, gender, and social protection. The indicators are 
organised by theme: (1) public expenditures, and (2) policies, programmes and legal 
frameworks. 
                                               
5 Emerging donors such as China, Brazil, South Africa and India are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) and comparable data for these donors are not 
available, hence they are not included in the index. 
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Indicators reflect on: 
 the nature of donors’ bilateral aid, in terms of size, stability and endurance, and 
keeping in mind a country’s capacity (and, in the case of climate change, 
responsibility) to support developing countries. The public spending indicators employ 
a ‘fair share’ principle. Here, each donor’s financial contributions are expressed 
relative to its wealth (GNI). Accordingly, a country’s GNI is expressed as a share of all 
23 countries’ accumulative GNI, and its actual aid contribution (e.g. to nutrition or to 
agriculture and food security) is compared to its share of GNI, to assess whether a 
country contributes its fair share; 
 the coherence of donors’ domestic policies and foreign aid objectives towards 
addressing hunger and undernutrition reduction (especially in relation to climate 
change and agricultural sector protection); 
 donor leadership in furthering international joint action on global public goods critical 
for addressing hunger and undernutrition (e.g. climate change and biodiversity). 
2.2.1 Hunger reduction commitment indicators 
The index assesses political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition and increase 
food security, all of which are multifaceted. We deliberately include indicators that allow the 
index to assess donor support for ‘curative’ action (efforts that seek to address immediate 
needs) as well as ‘preventive’ action (efforts to avert future hunger and undernutrition 
incidence, to reduce food insecurity and to prevent people from becoming malnourished). 
Consequently, some of our proxy indicators measure interventions that are not primarily 
instituted to combat hunger or undernutrition (e.g. achieving CO2 emission reduction 
pledges; protection of domestic agricultural markets; gender objectives in ODA). 
Nevertheless, donors recognise that these efforts contribute to hunger reduction and 
improved nutrition statuses in the short, medium and long term, and are therefore included in 
the index. The discussion below sets out the justification for each of the indicators. 
The nine hunger reduction commitment indicators include four indicators for the public 
expenditures theme: 
ODA to agriculture and food security as a percentage of the fair share required 
This indicator follows the HRCI (te Lintelo et al. 2011) and HungerFREE Scorecards 
(ActionAid 2009, 2010) approach. The FAO assessed that an additional US$30 billion per 
year investment in agriculture and rural infrastructure (additional to emergency food aid) is 
needed to boost food security (ActionAid 2009).6 It is assumed that developing countries will 
fund about a third of the increase needed, requiring donors to provide the shortfall of $20 
billion. Bilateral and multilateral donor spending in these areas has been about $8.4 billion 
per year, so the total donor funding needed in 2012 is approximated as $28.4 billion per year. 
This indicator applies a fair share principle to assess whether some donors are bearing a 
bigger part of the burden (relative to their ability to contribute) than others. A country’s fair 
share is calculated by multiplying its share of GNI in the total cumulative GNI for 23 countries 
with the required sum of $28.4 billion per year. The actual ODA to agriculture and food 
security (mean over 2009–11) is then divided by the fair share required (ODA actual/ODA as 
fair share required). 
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ODA to agriculture and food security: endurance and stability 
Whereas the previous indicator captures current investments in agriculture and food security 
by donors, this indicator considers whether donors enduringly support such investments. It 
assesses whether their support is stable rather than episodic. It assesses ODA to agriculture 
and food security (as share of the overall bilateral ODA portfolio) on a year-by-year basis 
over the past decade, and uses standard deviations as a measure to assess the stability of 
investments over time. 
Countries are clustered in four groups and countries within a given group are allocated the 
same scores. First, countries are clustered in respect of their (a) share of ODA to agriculture 
and food security in their overall ODA portfolio. Countries are allocated scores of 1, 2, 3 or 4 
each for bottom to top quartiles (4 = best). Second, countries are clustered for the stability of 
their decadal spending (b), using standard deviations as criteria. The quartile with lowest 
standard deviations gains a score of 4, while the quartile with highest standard deviations 
gains a score of 1. Finally, the sum of (a) and (b) is calculated for each country. 
ODA to social protection as a percentage of the fair share required 
This indicator expresses donor countries’ ODA on social protection as a fair share. The 
benchmark figure of $52.4 billion is based on estimations of the cost of extending a ‘minimum 
essential package’ comprising community-based management of acute malnutrition, 
employment guarantee programmes, social pensions, and child growth promotion in order to 
globally eliminate seasonal hunger and chronic undernutrition and to enhance food security 
throughout the year (Devereux et al. 2008). It estimates the costs as amounting to £48.52 
billion ($78.64 billion) annually. It further assumes that rich countries need to bear two-thirds 
of the financial burden. Consequently, developed countries need to collectively invest $52.4 
billion each year for social protection in developing countries (ActionAid 2009). Country 
scores are based on actual ODA expenditure vs fair share ratio. 
ODA to climate change (mitigation and adaptation) compared to fair share required 
Climate change is a major threat to food security in developing countries, in particular for 
small-scale farmers, as it induces higher variability in weather patterns and increases the 
occurrence of extreme weather events. For consumers, climate change impacts may cause 
greater volatility of food prices and a higher likelihood of price spike occurrences in future. 
This indicator assesses the aid that donors give to support developing countries to mitigate 
and adapt to climate change. In the absence of a fair share benchmark figure of total ODA 
needed for climate change adaptation and mitigation, this indicator employs an alternative 
way of expressing a country’s efforts compared to a fair share. The fair share principle draws 
on the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework (Baer et al. 2008). It posits that all 
people (in developed and developing countries) have a right to develop and should not be 
burdened with a responsibility to address climate change until they achieve a level of 
development that satisfies essential human needs such as food, shelter, health, education, 
etc.7 Baer et al. (2008) accordingly calculate a ‘capacity and responsibility index’, using a 
country’s wealth as a proxy for historical greenhouse gas emissions (responsibility), whereas 
a measure of equity is built in to demand that those people who can afford (have capacity) 
should contribute to the costs of addressing climate change.8 The 23 OECD countries 
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 This development threshold is set at an income of $20 a day at purchasing power parity. 
8
 It thus ‘takes intranational income disparities formally into account, stepping beyond the usual practice of relying on national 
per-capita averages, which fail to capture either the true depth of a country’s developmental need or the actual extent of its 
wealth’ (Baer et al. 2008:13). 
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covered by the index are responsible and have capacity to take care of 71.12 per cent of the 
global emission reductions needed9 (Baer et al. 2008). 
The indicator calculates a country’s mean ODA commitment to climate change10 as a share 
of all 23 donors’ contributions (over 2009–11). A country’s share of ODA commitments is 
then compared to its historical responsibility and capacity to contribute to addressing climate 
change, based on the Responsibility and Capacity Index calculations.11 
The HANCI Donor Index’s second theme, policies, programmes and legal frameworks, 
focuses on the efforts that donor countries make towards reforming (a) domestic policies and 
legislation, and (b) international aid architectures and legal agreements that contribute to 
food and nutrition insecurity outcomes in the developing world. Donor countries’ hunger 
reduction commitment is assessed for five policies, programmes and legal framework 
indicators, as follows. 
Protection for domestic agricultural markets 
Many developed countries provide trade protection to domestic agricultural producers. 
Agricultural subsidies and tariffs distort trade, and are unfair on farmers in developing 
countries who are not subsidised. Low levels of protection thus signify a commitment to 
strengthen production incentives for farmers in the developing world, to strengthen their 
economies, enhance incomes to purchase food, and to enhance production incentives and 
volumes. This indicator assesses levels of protection of domestic agricultural markets. Data 
are derived from the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) (Roodman 2012). 
Biofuels mandates 
Domestic policies and laws in donor countries incentivising biofuels production perversely 
drive the conversion of food into fuel (e.g. maize into ethanol), drive the use of productive 
arable land for growing crops for uses other than human food consumption, and drive the 
upward movement of food prices (OECD and FAO 2011; Durham et al. 2012). Biofuels are 
furthermore associated with land grabs. Moreover, the current generation of biofuels 
increase carbon emissions, when the effects of land use change are taken into account 
(Searchinger et al. 2008).12 
Legal and policy mandates in donor (and in developing) countries drive the production of 
biofuels. A wide range of policy instruments are used, including subsidies, tariffs, research 
and development (R&D) investments, credit support, etc. Blending mandates are among the 
most significant measures driving biofuels production (Gerasimchuk et al. 2012). This 
indicator accordingly assesses donor countries’ biofuels blending mandates (established in 
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 To achieve atmospheric concentrations of CO2 consonant with global temperature increases of less than 2 degrees 
centigrade. 
10
 The data are based on the ‘Rio markers’ on climate change mitigation and adaptation, established by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), in collaboration with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Secretariat. 
11
 In the absence of a benchmark figure of costs needed to contain global warming to within 2 degrees centigrade (either for 
sufficiently reducing emissions, or for adaptation and mitigation costs), we compare a country’s share in the total ODA spend on 
climate change mitigation and adaptation (which is unlikely to be sufficient compared to what is needed) to its responsibility to 
reduce emissions. In future editions of the HANCI Donor Index, we will seek to sharpen up this indicator. 
12
 Currently, the most important biofuels concern ethanol and biodiesel. For ethanol, globally, maize and sugar cane are 
expected to remain the major feedstocks over the coming decade. By 2020, 12 per cent of the global production of coarse 
grains is estimated to be used for producing ethanol (compared to 11 per cent on average over the 2008–10 period). Moreover, 
in the coming decade, 21 per cent of the global coarse grains production’s increase will be converted into biofuel (OECD and 
FAO 2011). 
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law, or as policy goals for future achievement), expressed as a percentage of total car fuel 
consumption.13 
Effected pledge on CO2 reductions 
This indicator assesses the extent to which donors show leadership on climate change 
through making unconditional commitments to reduce greenhouse gases, and assesses 
whether countries are on track to deliver on such pledges. With the Kyoto Protocol coming to 
an end and international climate change negotiations in deadlock, this indicator assesses 
(residual) political leadership on climate change. It assesses the minimum unconditional CO2 
emission reduction commitments14 as per the Copenhagen Accord (2009). As countries use 
different base years for their CO2 emission reduction targets pledged to be achieved by 
2020, we express pledges in terms of annual linear CO2 reduction targets. These are 
compared to actually achieved annual emission reductions, drawing on data from the 
UNFCCC, and include emissions from land use, and land use change and forestry for the 
latest available year (UNFCCC 2012b).15 
National adaptation strategies/plans for climate change 
This indicator considers that donor countries’ climate change adaptation policies are critical 
for anticipating, adapting to, and minimising the damaging effects of climate change on 
domestic food production. Donor countries are among the world’s biggest agricultural 
producers of staple food crops such as wheat, sorghum, maize, potatoes (and, to a smaller 
extent, rice, millet, etc). Donor countries that do not put in place adaptation policies are less 
prepared to deal with growing vulnerability and climate change-induced production shocks. 
Being major international food producers, domestic shocks may reverberate in volatile global 
food production systems, with negative knock-on effects for food insecurity in developing 
countries.16 Countries are scored as follows: 1 = no strategy; 2 = actions without strategy; 3 = 
strategy, no plan; 4 = strategy and plan. Data are drawn from Mullan et al. 2013. 
Biodiversity 
Biological diversity at the levels of ecosystems, the species they contain, and the genetic 
diversity within species (Toledo and Burlingame 2006) is a critical global public good. It is 
fundamental to agricultural production and food security17 (Thrupp 2000; Chappell and 
Lavalle 2009). Moreover, the practices used for enhancing biodiversity are tied to the rich 
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 While there is growing realisation that policy stimulation for adopting second and third generation biofuels crops using non-
food feedstock (such as algae or biomass waste) may help overcome the conversion of food to fuel and shifts in land use 
affecting food production, currently, few subnational, national, or supranational authorities have developed such policies. The 
OECD ‘remains very cautious on the medium-term potential of second generation biofuels’ (OECD and FAO 2011: 87). The EU, 
however, seems to be moving towards supporting second generation biofuels. While retaining its ambition to move from the 
current 5.75 per cent to a 10 per cent biofuels goal for 2020, it wants additional biofuels to be sourced from non-food and non-
feed biofuel feedstock (Lane 2012; Wisner 2013). 
14
 The Copenhagen Accord includes various kinds of commitments by signatory countries, often referencing different base years 
and annual reduction levels. Some countries have given unconditional offers; others have made offers conditional on other 
countries’ doing the same. For instance, Australia ‘will unconditionally reduce its emissions by 5 per cent compared with 2000 
levels by 2020 and by up to 15 per cent by 2020 if there is a global agreement which falls short of securing atmospheric 
stabilisation at 450 ppm CO, eq under which major developing economies commit to substantially restraining their emissions 
and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia’s’ (UNFCCC 2012a). It is argued here that 
unconditional offers provide the best measure of leadership and commitment to address climate change. 
15
 It is appreciated that, in some cases, actual emission reductions reflect economic downturns rather than committed 
government action to reduce these. 
16
 The levels of policy preparedness need to be understood within context. Arguably, plans for adaptation are particularly 
important for those countries having substantial food production. In future editions of the index, this indicator may be weighted 
for the relative importance of countries’ contribution to global food production – i.e. for relatively large producers, it may be more 
serious if no adaptation policies are put in place. 
17
 Predominant patterns of agricultural growth have eroded biodiversity in, for example, plant genetic resources, livestock, 
insects and soil organisms. The expansion of agriculture in ‘natural’ habitats in frontier areas has caused the loss of biodiversity 
(Thrupp 2000; Chappell and Lavalle 2009). Future editions of the HANCI Donor Index may further explore how donors support 
more sustainable forms of agriculture. 
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cultural diversity and local knowledge that support the livelihood of agricultural communities 
worldwide (Thrupp 2000). 
This indicator assesses donors for their efforts on three international treaties that aim to 
safeguard biodiversity: 
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992); 
 The Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2009); 
 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (2001). 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the chief international treaty aiming to 
protect biodiversity. It has three objectives: the conservation of biological diversity; the 
sustainable use of the components of biological diversity; and the fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources (Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 2012). National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) are 
the principal instruments for implementing the Convention at the national level.18 
Fish stocks are a critical source of animal protein for substantial parts of the world’s 
population. The CBD includes targets to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems, and calls for 
establishing Marine Protected Areas to conserve 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas. 
Various other international treaties, declarations and agreements are in place to support the 
governance of fish stocks. The Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2009) is a global, legally binding 
instrument that strikes at the key reason behind such fishing – economic profit – in order to 
support responsible and sustainable fisheries (Kuemlangan and Press 2010). The main 
purpose of the Agreement is to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing through the implementation of robust port state measures. The 
Agreement enables port states to regulate foreign vessels when seeking entry to ports or 
while they are in port. It widens responsibility for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing violations from flag states to port states, and stipulates minimum port state measures 
(FAO 2012a). 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (2001) also 
plays a role in the fight against hunger (Toledo and Burlingame 2006). The Treaty 
establishes a legally binding global framework for the sustainable conservation of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture. A global pool of genetic resources is put in place 
for 64 crops (accounting for 80 per cent of global plant-based foods). The pool is freely 
available to potential users in the Treaty’s ratifying nations for research, breeding and 
training for food and agriculture uses. The Treaty also recognises farmers’ rights and the 
historical contribution farmers have made to the world’s wealth of plant genetic resources 
(FAO 2013). 
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 The Convention requires countries to prepare a national biodiversity strategy (or equivalent instrument) and to ensure that this 
strategy is mainstreamed. The tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention in Nagoya in 2010 calls 
on countries to implement the 2011–2020 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, including a set of targets known as the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets. These are to be incorporated in revised and updated NBSAPs. A set of 20 biodiversity targets are to be 
monitored in coming years. Currently, these data are not yet available; though this will be reviewed in future HANCI Donor Index 
reports. 
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The HANCI Donor Index indicator calculates a mean country score over three aspects: 
 The status of the NBSAPs implementation by Parties to the CBD.19 Countries gain the 
following score: 
0 = not parties to CBD 
1 = Parties developing first NBSAP 
2 = Parties have NBSAP, not started revision process 
3 = Parties with NBSAPs under revision or previously revised 
4 = Parties that have revised NBSAPs post-Nagoya Protocol (from 2011 onwards) 
 The signatory status of donor countries to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (2001). Countries gain the following score: 
0 = no contracting party 
2 = signatory 
4 = ratified, acceded, accepted, approved 
 The signatory status of donor countries to the Agreement on Port State Measures to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2009). 
Countries gain the following score: 
0 = no contracting party 
2 = signatory 
4 = ratified, acceded, accepted, approved 
2.2.2 Nutrition commitment indicators 
For nutrition commitment, the following three public expenditure indicators were selected. 
ODA to nutrition as a percentage of the fair share required 
Current investments in nutrition are inadequate (Coppard and Zubairi 2011; Action Against 
Hunger 2012; Di Ciommo 2013). The World Bank assesses that the annual cost of scaling up 
13 priority and highly cost-effective nutrition interventions (identified by The Lancet 2008 
Series) amounts to $11.8 billion. Out of this, $1.5 billion is expected to be borne by private 
household resources (High Level Taskforce on the Global Food Security Crisis 2010; Horton 
et al. 2010).20 This leaves a total financing gap of $10.3 billion to be raised from public 
resources to support the scale-up of nutrition measures. 
‘Tracking ODA to nutrition in the CRS database is more accurate when multiple purpose 
codes are used’ (Action Against Hunger 2012, executive summary).21 Accordingly, we 
calculate countries’ ODA to nutrition by summing up: 
 ‘Basic nutrition’ (purpose code 12240), classified as: direct feeding programmes 
(maternal feeding, breastfeeding and complementary feeding, child feeding, school 
feeding); determination of micronutrient deficiencies; provision of vitamin A, iodine, 
iron, etc.; monitoring of nutritional status; nutrition and food hygiene education; and 
household food security. 
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 The CBD has been accepted and ratified by most countries in the world. Those who have not (USA and South Sudan) are 
given a zero score. 
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 In future editions of the HANCI Donor Index, the total figures needed are likely to come down. Thus, Spratt (2012) estimates 
global figures to amount to $10 billion by 2015 and $8.94 billion by 2025. He also notes that shifts in regional patterns of need 
are expected, with reducing shares having to support South East Asia and South Central Asia. 
21
 Greater accuracy could be achieved further if the analysis had focused on individual projects (ACF 2012). Doing this 
consistently for all ODA indicators used in the HANCI Donor Index was, however, beyond the scope of this report. 
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 ‘Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation’: water supply and sanitation 
through low-cost technologies such as handpumps, spring catchment, gravity-fed 
systems, rain water collection, storage tanks, small distribution systems; latrines, 
small-bore sewers, on-site disposal (septic tanks). 
 ‘Education/training in drinking water supply and sanitation’. 
 ‘Infectious disease control’: immunisation; prevention and control of malaria, 
tuberculosis, diarrhoeal diseases, vector-borne diseases (e.g. river blindness and 
guinea worm), etc. (OECD no date).dovedale1412 
  
This indicator applies a fair share principle to assess whether some donors are bearing a 
bigger part of the burden (relative to their ability to contribute) than others. A country’s fair 
share is calculated by multiplying its share of GNI in the total cumulative GNI for 23 countries 
with the $10.3 billion. The actual ODA to nutrition for the latest available year (2011) is then 
divided by the fair share required (ODA actual/ODA as fair share required). 
ODA to nutrition: endurance and stability 
Whereas the previous indicator captures current investments in nutrition by donors, this 
indicator considers whether donors have enduringly supported nutrition investments over the 
past decade, and further assesses whether support is stable rather than episodic. It 
assesses ODA to nutrition as a share of the overall bilateral ODA portfolio on a year-by-year 
basis over the past decade, and calculates standard deviations as a measure to assess the 
stability of investments over time. 
Countries are clustered in four groups and countries within a given group are allocated the 
same scores. First, countries are clustered in respect of their (a) share of ODA to nutrition in 
their overall ODA portfolio. Countries are allocated scores of 1, 2, 3 or 4 each for bottom to 
top quartiles (4 = best). Second, countries are clustered for the stability of their decadal 
spending (b). The quartile with lowest standard deviations gains a score of 4, while the 
quartile with highest standard deviations gains a score of 1. Finally, the sum of (a) and (b) is 
calculated for each country. 
ODA to nutrition: commitments vs disbursements 
The group of 23 OECD countries collectively fail to deliver 11 per cent of commitments made 
to nutrition, whereas the fulfilment of individual donor commitments varies widely (ACF 2012: 
6). This indicator hence assesses the extent to which individual countries disburse the ODA 
commitments they make for nutrition. It simply compares annual commitments and actual 
disbursements in the latest three available years (2009–11) to assess whether donors ‘walk 
the walk’. 
We further identified two indicators for the policies, programmes and legal frameworks theme 
to assess nutrition commitment: 
SUN movement membership 
This indicator ascertains whether or not donor countries have signed up to the SUN 
movement, which aims to help countries affected by undernutrition to achieve long-term 
reduction in undernutrition, and seeks to achieve a global push for action and investment to 
improve maternal and child nutrition (SUN 2012a). SUN has kept or put nutrition high on the 
political agenda of a range of donor and recipient countries, and successfully promoted a 
multisectoral approach to undernutrition and the concept of ‘nutrition focused’ development 
(Mousseau 2012). 
15 
The indicator expresses whether countries support SUN directly, indirectly (for EU countries 
only22), or do not support it. 
ODA disbursements with a gender policy objective 
This indicator highlights the extent to which donor countries incorporate gender-focused 
policy objectives in their aid disbursements. This indicator is not specific to food and nutrition; 
however, it is included because broad-based support for gender equity may, for instance, 
contribute to the breaking down of barriers for women’s equal access to income-generating 
opportunities and to productive agricultural land and its produce, etc. The indicator scores 
are calculated as the proportion of aid having ‘principal’ or ‘significant’ gender objectives in a 
country’s overall ODA. The donors self-report these data to the OECD Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS) database. 
Table 2.3 gives an overview of the indicators by sector and dimension of food and nutrition 
security. 
Table 2.3 Political commitment indicators by sector and dimension of 
food and nutrition security 
 Food and agriculture Nutrition, social protection, health 
Availability of food 
and key nutrients 
ODA to agriculture and food security: fair 
share 
ODA to agriculture and food security: 
commitment vs disbursement 
ODA to climate change: fair share 
Effected pledge CO2 emissions 
Climate change adaptation strategies/plans 
Biodiversity 
ODA to nutrition: fair share 
ODA to nutrition: endurance and 
stability 
ODA to nutrition: commitment vs 
disbursement 
Access to food and 
key nutrients 
Protection of domestic agriculture ODA to social protection: fair share 
SUN membership 
Utilisation of food 
and key nutrients 
Biofuels mandates  
The indicator ‘ODA with gender policy objective’ is not shown, as it cross-cuts multiple cells 
in the table. 
Finally, it should be noted that HANCI Donor Index indicators share a common limitation: 
they weakly express the quality of government efforts. Arguably, real commitment should be 
reflected in spending that reflects value for money and in thorough implementation of policies 
and laws. Typically, such data do not exist to allow for comparisons between countries. This 
is a problem across this whole class of commitment and governance indicators. 
The ODA spending data used in the HANCI Donor Index primarily draw on the Creditor 
Reporting System Aid Activities Database of the OECD-DAC. The database provides readily 
available basic data that enables analysis on where aid goes, what purposes it serves and 
what policies it aims to implement, on a comparable basis for all DAC members. The HANCI 
Donor Index employs bilateral aid data only.23 It employs the most up-to-date figures (for 
2011) on bilateral ODA. Wherever data for the latest year was not complete for one or more 
countries, we calculated mean spending levels over three years to ensure availability and 
                                               
22
 EU countries can support SUN directly. Where they do not, they indirectly support SUN through the European Union. 
23
 Donor countries provide additional support to multilateral agencies (as core or non-core funding). The OECD currently does 
not provide detailed overviews of the size of multilateral aid flows by purpose code. Recent efforts to impute country-specific 
multilateral aid flows for nutrition suggest substantial variation between countries’ preferences for multilateral or bilateral aid (Di 
Ciommo 2013). 
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comparability of data for all countries. The OECD’s CRS database is currently the best 
available data, though certainly not without limitations.24 
2.3 Index design 
Having set out the selected indicators, this subsection reflects on the structure and technical 
design choices underpinning the HANCI Donor Index. 
The HANCI is constructed using secondary data.25 It is composed of two sub-indices on: 
 hunger reduction commitment; 
 nutrition commitment. 
Each sub-index is composed of two themes: (1) public expenditures, and (2) policies, 
programmes and legal frameworks. Each theme contains seven indicators (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 The structure of the HANCI Donor Index 
 
We present a composite HANCI score and ranking for each country, based on the scores 
and ranks achieved for hunger reduction commitment and nutrition commitment. We do so in 
order to emphasise the intrinsic linkages between hunger and undernutrition, and also 
because of the ease of communicating one overall ranking per country (rather than two) to 
key stakeholders, including policymakers and campaigners. While there is a trade-off 
between ease of communication and data specificity, we offer the HANCI rankings as a 
starting point, from where readers can dig deeper and zoom in on those aspects of hunger 
and/or nutrition commitment that are of particular relevance. 
Table 2.4 provides an overview of the indicators. 
                                               
24
 ‘The CRS database is problematic to use for detailed tracking of ODA to the nutrition sector due to poor donor reporting 
practices and limitations with the CRS database itself’ (ACF International 2012a, executive summary). Similarly, the pledges of 
$22 billion funding made at the 2009 l‘Aquila Food Security Initiative were characterised by opaque monitoring mechanisms, 
and difficulties determining the extent to which new monies were disbursed (ONE 2010). One report concludes that ‘Current 
reporting practices for both government and donor funding do not allow a proper monitoring of spending on food and nutrition’ 
(ACF International 2012b: 41). 
25
 STATA datasets and syntax files are available on request. 
3
IndicatorsThemesSub-indicesIndex
HANCI
Hunger 
Reduction 
Commitment
Policies, 
programmes, 
legal
5
Public 
expenditures
4
Nutrition 
Commitment
Policies, 
programmes, 
legal
2
Public 
expenditures
3
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Table 2.4 Overview of the HRCI and NCI indicators 
Theme Indicator 
Hunger Reduction Commitment Index 
 Expenditure ODA to agriculture and food security as % of the fair share required 
ODA to agriculture and food security: endurance and stability 
ODA to social protection as % of the fair share required 
ODA to climate change (mitigation and adaptation) as % of the fair share 
required 
Policies, 
programmes, legal 
frameworks 
Protection for domestic agricultural markets 
National climate change adaptation strategy/plan 
Biofuels mandates 
Effected pledge on CO2 reductions 
Biodiversity 
Nutrition Commitment Index 
 Expenditure ODA to nutrition as % of the fair share required 
ODA to nutrition: endurance and stability 
ODA to nutrition: commitments vs disbursements 
Policies, 
programmes, legal 
frameworks 
ODA disbursements with gender policy objective: share of total 
Membership of Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement 
Having identified indicators, we used a theoretical rather than a data-driven approach (e.g. 
factor analysis, principal components analysis, etc.) to constructing the index because: (1) 
we want users of the index to understand the rationale for indicator choice; (2) we want the 
weighting to be easy to understand; and (3) we feel that the theory behind hunger and 
nutrition measurement and commitment is sufficiently well developed to guide choices. 
Nevertheless, as part of a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the HANCI Donor 
Index, we do compare its rankings with an index driven by a principal components analysis 
and a factor analysis (Chapter 4). 
Table 2.5 Actual and alternative design choices for the HANCI Donor 
Index 
 HANCI Donor Index Alternative options 
Normalisation Re-scaling using HDI methodology Standardisation (Z-score) 
Weighting 
schemes 
Equal weighting by theme Equal weighting by indicator 
Factor analysis/Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) 
Aggregation 
and scoring 
Borda scores only (for themes; sub-
indices; HANCI) 
Additive values only 
Additive values and Borda scores 
Borda scores only (for indicators, and themes) 
The index structure is influenced by various technical decisions about normalisation, 
weighting schemes and scoring techniques. Table 2.5 provides an overview of actual versus 
some alternative design choices. In the following paragraphs we set out design choices 
underpinning the HANCI. The sensitivity analysis in Chapter 4 shows how alternative design 
choices affect HANCI outcomes. 
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2.3.1 Aggregation, normalisation and scoring 
Indicators need to be normalised before being aggregated. Normalisation prevents an 
indicator from having greater weight in the determination of an index simply because of its 
unit of measurement. For example, adding infant mortality rate (absolutely low) and 
undernutrition rate (absolutely large) without normalising, implicitly attributes higher weight to 
the item that is absolutely larger (assuming they have similar variances). The normalisation 
procedure we use is the one adopted by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), which re-scales indicators based on the following 
formula: 
 
This normalises the value of all indicators to [0,1] range. Going back to the earlier example of 
infant mortality versus undernutrition, both variables will lie in the [0,1] range after this re-
scaling. Some indicators (e.g. the dichotomous variables) in the HANCI are already in the 
[0,1] range, hence this re-scaling is redundant for them. Having all indicators in a uniform 
range is of particular value to the HANCI as it mitigates unequal weight being given to 
indicators as a result of their scale. Other normalising methods such as standardisation and 
distance to a reference country, while useful under other circumstances, do not constrain the 
normalised indicators within a uniform range.26 This was the main reason why we did not use 
them in the HANCI. However, a robust or ‘meaningful’ index would produce a ranking that is 
invariant to these choices (Ebert and Welsch 2004). The sensitivity analysis in Chapter 4 
accordingly assesses whether the HANCI rankings are robust to alternative design choices. 
After normalisation, indicator scores were aggregated to form the HANCI. This was done in 
two steps: (1) aggregation of indicators to form four composite indicators formed around the 
two themes and two sub-indices; and (2) aggregation of thematic and sub-index level 
composite indicators (CIT) to form the overall composite indicator (CI) which is the HANCI. 
Both of these aggregations were done using additive methods. Aggregation of indicators at 
thematic level was done as the summation of weighted and normalised indicators: 
 
where ∑wi=1 and 0≤wi≤1 for all i. In the case of the HANCI, the indicator weights were equal 
within each of them, i.e. wi=wj for all i and j within each theme. The next round of aggregation 
was done at the theme level. This too was an equally weighted aggregation but using the 
Borda rule instead of a summation because we employ indicators that are measured on 
continuous and ordinal scales (whose values can therefore not be meaningfully summed up). 
The Borda rule used here is: 
 
where ∑wT=1 and 0≤wT≤1 for all T=expenditure, policy, and legal themes. Again, equal 
weights were selected in this aggregation, such that each theme was equally weighted in the 
HANCI. However, this means that individual normalised indicators ( ) are not equally 
weighted in the HANCI even though they are equally weighted within themes. 
                                               
26
 Not all normalisation methods can be applied to the HANCI. For a fuller list see Nardo et al. 2005. 
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Various ranking schemes can be employed once indicator scores are calculated, before 
and/or after aggregation. One disadvantage of ranking is that it leads to a loss of information. 
Table 2.6 illustrates that the ranking scheme employed can have impacts on the overall 
ranks for countries. 
Table 2.6 Hypothetical cardinal and Borda ranking schemes compared 
Country Legal  
framework (a) 
Policies and 
programmes (b) 
Public 
expenditures (c) 
Cardinal  
ranking 
Borda  
ranking 
 Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Add up 
values 
Overall 
ranks 
Add up 
ranks 
Overall 
ranks 
One  0.6 2 0.5 3 0.9 1 2.0 First 6 Second  
Two 0.3 3 0.6 2 0.5 2 1.4 Third 7 Third 
Three 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.1 3 1.7 Second 5 First  
Note: Indicator scores between 0 and 1, with 1 as best. 
One major advantage of Borda ranking is that it allows for easy comparison of indicators 
expressed on different scales. HANCI indicators are measured on both cardinal, continuous 
and ordinal, dichotomous scales.27 We thus use a Borda scheme to preserve the ordinal 
nature of the index. In other words, rather than ranking the values of the indicators across 
themes we rank the sum of the rankings across themes (Dasgupta 2001). One disadvantage 
of using the Borda scheme is that it gives only a ranking. However, for an index of this type, it 
is the best that can be done. 
2.3.2 Weighting schemes 
This sub-subsection draws substantially on a recent review of the literature on weighting 
schemes by Decancq and Lugo (2010). These authors identify various approaches that use 
information that is very different in nature, leading to diverse weighting schemes. Any 
weighting scheme involves trade-offs between the dimensions of the index. As there is no 
widely accepted theoretical framework on how to set these trade-offs, researchers need to 
consider the reasonability of implied trade-offs between the dimensions and exercise 
common sense and caution (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
Normative, equal weighting 
The HANCI applies a subjective, theory-driven weighting scheme that allocates equal 
weights to: 
 each of the two sub-indices, such that the hunger reduction commitment and nutrition 
commitment sub-indices each contribute 50 per cent to overall HANCI scores; 
 each of the two themes: public expenditures, and policies, programmes and legal 
frameworks (within the sub-indices and consequently in the overall HANCI). 
Although equal weighting schemes are often defended from an agnostic perspective, they 
are not uncontroversial. Like any other weighting scheme, equal weighting involves value 
choices regarding the substitutability of various dimensions of the index, without specifying 
the normative attractiveness of such choices (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
                                               
27
 E.g. the relative share of a donor’s ODA to nutrition as fair share is expressed as a percentage within the min/max range, and 
thus measured on a continuous, cardinal scale. The indicator assessing whether or not a government is a member of the SUN 
movement is measured on an ordinal, trichotomous scale. 
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For the HANCI, we assume full substitutability of sub-indices and themes. Accordingly, a 
country’s performance on policies, programmes and legal frameworks indicators is deemed 
just as important as its performance on the public expenditure indicators. Moreover, its 
performance on hunger reduction is given the same importance as for improving nutrition. 
Given that the HANCI uses uneven numbers of indicators for its themes, and for its two sub-
indices, any weighting scheme applied at sub-index and thematic level implicitly affects the 
weightings attributed to the individual indicators (Table 2.7). This approach is also adopted, 
for instance, by the UNDP’s HDI and by the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index 
(Alkire et al. 2012). We thus privilege comprehensiveness over equality of weighting for 
indicators. That is, we do not want equal indicator weighting to drive down the number of 
indicators to the lowest common denominator, as we want to capture the multidimensional 
nature of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. Nevertheless, the 
downside of this choice is that some indicators currently weigh up to 2.5 times more than 
others. In future, additional indicators will be sought in order to come closer to equal 
weighting for all indicators. 
Table 2.7 Weightings in the HANCI Donor Index 
Index Sub-index Theme Indicator Weight 
HANCI 
Donor 
Index 
Hunger 
Reduction 
Commitment 
(1/2) 
Policies, 
programmes, legal 
frameworks (1/4) 
Effected pledge CO2 emissions 1/20 
Climate change adaptation strategies/plans 1/20 
Biodiversity 1/20 
Protection domestic agriculture 1/20 
Biofuels mandates 1/20 
Public expenditures 
(1/4) 
ODA to agriculture and food security: fair share 1/16 
ODA to agriculture and food security: 
commitment vs disbursement 
1/16 
ODA to climate change: fair share 1/16 
ODA to social protection: fair share 1/16 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
(1/2) 
Policies, 
programmes, Legal 
frameworks (1/4) 
SUN membership 1/8 
ODA with gender policy objective 1/8 
Public expenditures 
(1/4) 
ODA to nutrition: fair share 1/12 
ODA to nutrition: endurance and stability 1/12 
ODA to nutrition: commitment vs disbursement 1/12 
In order to compare our subjective allocation of equal weights to themes with alternative 
preferences, we devised a simple exercise that allows third parties to set their own subjective 
weights. This exercise avoids imposing the weighting preference of a group of researchers at 
IDS. A web-based tool allows HANCI website visitors (www.hancindex.org) to apply their 
own subjective weighting schemes to the two themes, and see how these affect donor 
country rankings.28 
Data-driven weighting 
Various statistical devices can be used in data-driven approaches to identify weighting 
schemes.29 We can distinguish descriptive and explanatory models. 
                                               
28
 Our web-based tool (www.hancindex.org) shows, for the HANCI Donor Index, how website visitor-determined weighting 
schemes produce different rankings from our equal weighting of themes. For the developing country HANCI, a further option 
compares this with (1) expert and (2) community weighting schemes. 
29
 Other data-driven approaches use frequency-based weights or most favourable weights. 
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Explanatory models (such as factor analysis) assume that some observed indicators are 
dependent on a certain number of unobserved latent variables (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
Descriptive statistical models such as principal component analysis (PCA) or cluster analysis 
aim to minimise double counting, as indicators within the model may be strongly correlated 
and thus capture the same latent dimension. PCA has been widely used to build indices of 
‘wealth’ or ‘intelligence’ (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Hunt 2007). It assigns weights to 
indicators based on their correlations in order to find the ‘principal component’ that best 
represents the available data. In PCA, the set of indicators is transformed into an equal 
number of mutually uncorrelated (orthogonal) linear combinations of indicators, each 
explaining a proportion of the variance in the data (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
Data-driven approaches have the advantage of being ‘objective’ and seemingly avoid value 
judgements. They also have several limitations: PCA, factor analysis and other multivariate 
statistical approaches to determine weights are atheoretical and non-transparent. They do 
not offer clear explanatory narratives for their findings and therefore do not speak easily to 
policymakers and non-specialist audiences. Moreover, weights based on data-driven 
approaches can change between different editions of the same index, so that comparability 
over time is lost (this is a critical objective of the HANCI). Furthermore, PCA assigns lower 
weights to dimensions that are poorly correlated. This procedure may not be suitable, 
because the HANCI needs to capture multiple underlying dimensions of political 
commitment, which may not necessarily be strongly correlated (see Somarriba and Pena 
2009, in Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
Keeping in mind these limitations, in the sensitivity analysis presented in Chapter 4 we 
compare the implications that equal weighting and data-driven weighting approaches have 
for HANCI Donor Index outcomes. 
2.4 Methodology for primary data collection: expert perception 
surveys 
In addition to the secondary data-based HANCI Donor Index, the project collected primary 
data on political commitment through an expert perceptions survey administered over the 
internet. 
Four identical surveys were conducted in the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany and the UK. 
The survey employed a structured questionnaire posing more than 30 questions plus sub-
questions. The instrument employs five-point Likert scales, where respondents are asked to 
indicate their level of agreement with statements and questions, with low scores 
corresponding to high levels of government commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition 
(1 = very strongly, 2 = strongly, 3 = moderately, 4 = weakly, 5 = very weakly). 
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Survey questions were designed to capture the following aspects (or indicators) of political 
commitment (cf Brinkerhoff 2000): 
 Credible incentives: The institutionalisation of credible incentives for individuals and 
donor agencies (e.g. is poor performance towards achieving nutrition and hunger 
policy objectives sanctioned, and is success rewarded with, say, promotions and 
extra resources?) 
 Policy coordination: Donors show leadership coordinating policy among themselves 
and with recipient countries’ institutions. 
 Locus of policy origin (e.g. do donor agency country offices have sufficient flexibility to 
create programmatic action that is sensitive to the country context, to foster 
ownership?) 
 Learning and adaptation mechanisms and practices (e.g. regular monitoring and 
evaluation in donor agencies). 
 Evidence: The marshalling of scientific evidence in donor decision-making processes 
(e.g. is policy informed by new insights on how to address undernutrition?) 
 Mobilisation of stakeholders (e.g. do donor agencies actively aim to get widespread 
support for their interventions domestically and overseas?) 
 Public commitment: (e.g. Are donor policy preferences revealed, and resources 
assigned to achieve these open to public scrutiny?) 
 Government intention and action (e.g. What kind of a priority does the aid programme 
give to hunger and malnutrition?) 
 Resource allocation and expenditures (e.g. What is the strength, relevance and 
sufficiency of expenditures on hunger/malnutrition reduction policies and 
programmes?) 
 Continuity of effort (e.g. Are donor efforts strong and sustained, or episodic, one-shot 
efforts?) 
 Coherence of domestic policy with aid policy for hunger and undernutrition reduction. 
These commitment aspects were incorporated in various questions. Table 2.8 provides a 
summary for the UK survey. 
The surveys were conducted between July and September 2012 and employed a web-based 
module (Survey Monkey). The research team identified 395 hunger and nutrition experts 
initially through personal networks, research partners, the European Association of 
Development Research and Training Institutes, and the Development Studies Associations in 
the UK and Ireland. 
All identified survey candidates were sent an invitation to participate, and where applicable 
we followed up with two further reminder emails. Those respondents who participated were 
invited to suggest further survey candidates: this resulted in 31 suggestions, who were 
subsequently invited to participate in the survey.  
A total number of 91 respondents participated in the survey in the four countries. Overall 
response rates amounted to 23 per cent, varying by country between 20 and 26 per cent 
(Table 2.9). Such response rates compare somewhat less favourably with general web-
based survey response rates of 33 per cent (Nulty 2008). 
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Table 2.8 Overview of questions in expert survey, by indicator (UK 
example) 
Indicator Questions 
Resource 
allocation and 
expenditures 
Q31. To what extent are UK aid policy preferences (re: hunger and malnutrition 
reduction) reflected in budget expenditures? 
Q32 and 33. How strong or weak would you characterise UK aid expenditures on 
hunger and malnutrition, in (a) absolute (in money terms)? 
Q32 and 33. How strong or weak would you characterise UK aid expenditures on 
hunger and malnutrition, in (b) relative terms (keeping in mind the nature of the 
problem and relative to other aid spending)? 
Q34. In your opinion, how well has your country’s development agency (the 
Department for International Development (DFID)) developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked hunger and nutrition aid funding? 
Q35. How sensitive are UK aid budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to 
emergencies? 
Institutional 
coordination 
Q40 and 41. Hunger and malnutrition are typically an issue of relevance to multiple 
donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral). What level of intellectual leadership does 
UK aid demonstrate in (a) multilateral forums and (b) within a recipient country, with 
other donors? 
Q42 and 43. What level of practical leadership does UK aid demonstrate in (a) 
multilateral forums and (b) bilaterally within recipient countries (e.g. by chairing 
donor coordinating bodies on hunger and malnutrition)? 
Government 
intention and 
action 
Q7. What kind of a priority does the UK aid programme give to hunger and 
malnutrition? 
Q8. How does current attention to the theme of hunger and malnutrition in the UK 
aid programme compare to this one year ago? 
Q11. For those hunger and malnutrition reduction interventions identified as most 
important in UK aid, how sufficient are current efforts towards fulfilling policy goals? 
Q12 and 13. To what extent do UK aid officials speak out against hunger and 
malnutrition in: (a) international public forums; (b) recipient country public forums; 
and (c) recipient country private forums (with political, civil service and civil society 
leaders)? 
Locus of 
initiative 
Q15. To what extent do DFID (UK Department for International Development) in-
country offices enjoy flexibility to create hunger and malnutrition reduction 
programmes sensitive to country-specific circumstances? 
Analytical rigour Q16 and 17. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials have at (a) 
headquarters and (b) in-country offices of the status of hunger and malnutrition in 
recipient countries? 
Q18 and 19. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials have at (a) 
headquarters and (b) in- country offices of causal factors of hunger and 
malnutrition? 
Q20 and 21. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials have at (a) 
headquarters and (b) in-country offices of potential solutions for hunger and 
malnutrition? 
Q22. How important is scientific evidence in UK aid programmes on hunger and 
malnutrition reduction? 
Q23. How developed are UK aid systems (e.g. monitoring and evaluation, research 
and development) for generating knowledge and evidence for policy? 
Public 
commitment 
Q29. How clearly are policy preferences aiming to address hunger and malnutrition 
(in the developing world) set out in UK government publications? 
Q30. How open is UK government policy (aiming to address hunger and 
malnutrition)? 
Table 2.8 (cont’d.) 
Indicator Questions 
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Learning and 
adaptation 
Q24. In general, how likely are UK aid programmes and policies to be adjusted (e.g. 
to objectives, instruments, strategies and funding), when faced with strong evidence 
that suggests a change of course? 
Q25. To what extent does UK aid innovate and experiment with new policy 
approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and malnutrition? 
Q26. What level of importance do UK aid programmes give to informing and 
influencing hunger and malnutrition-relevant policies in recipient countries? 
Mobilisation of 
stakeholders 
Q27. How successfully do UK aid programmes muster adequate and ongoing 
support for its hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes in recipient countries? 
Q28. How would you evaluate UK government communication efforts towards 
domestic audiences to build and retain support for overseas hunger and malnutrition 
reduction programmes? 
Q36.How strongly is your country’s development agency (DFID) urging aid-receiving 
countries to develop nutrition budget lines in national budgets? 
Continuity of 
effort 
Q39. Is the UK aid programme on hunger and malnutrition best characterised as: (a) 
entirely long term, programme-oriented; (b) chiefly long term, programme-oriented; 
(c) mixture of long and short term, programme and project; (d) chiefly short term, 
project-focused; or (e) entirely short term, project-focused? 
Credible 
incentives 
Q37. For DFID as an agency, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and 
malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (e.g. through 
promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, 
etc)? 
Q38. For DFID (individual) staff, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and 
malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (e.g. through 
promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, 
etc)? 
Coherence 
domestic policy 
– aid policy 
Q44. To what extent do UK achievements to reduce CO2 emissions and efforts 
mitigating climate change cohere with the objectives of UK aid towards hunger and 
malnutrition reduction overseas? 
Q45. To what extent do UK domestic agricultural subsidy policies cohere with UK 
aid policy objectives regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction in developing 
countries? 
Q46. To what extent does the UK position in international trade negotiations (or the 
position it takes to influence EU trade policy) cohere with UK aid policy objectives 
regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction? 
Table 2.9 Response rates for web-based expert perception survey 
 Identified respondents Web-based expert surveys completed Response rate (%) 
UK 100 21 21 
Ireland 100 24 24 
Germany 85 17 20 
Netherlands 110 29 26 
Total 395 91 23 
Whereas the survey aimed to include a well-balanced set of experts working on hunger and 
undernutrition issues in government, academia, private sector, international donors, and civil 
society organisations, in practice participation rates varied substantially by sector (Table 
2.10). Strong representation from academia and international donors is combined with lower 
participation from civil society and from donor governments. This bias in our sample, 
combined with relatively low response rates, means that survey findings should be 
interpreted cautiously. 
Table 2.10 Summary of expert respondents 
Respondent type Web-based (Survey Monkey) 
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UK Ireland Netherlands Germany 
Academia/research 8 9 14 7 
NGO/civil society  2 1  
Government 3 2 4 4 
International organisations 11 8 9 5 
Others 2  4 1 
Total 24 21 29 17 
It should be noted that while the survey and the HANCI Donor Index complement one 
another by focusing on different aspects of political commitment, their results are not fully 
comparable. The index rankings compare a country relative to other OECD–DAC donors, 
whereas the surveys assess the country’s performance against an implicit (and unmeasured) 
standard of expectation held by the experts.30 
                                               
30
 It is theoretically possible that experts in different countries hold different standards of expectation, with some countries’ 
experts being particularly (un)demanding. 
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3 HANCI Donor Index 2012: findings 
drawing on secondary data 
This section presents findings for the HANCI Donor Index 2012 drawing on secondary data. 
Before presenting HANCI rankings, we first discuss some key features of the rankings. Then, 
we analyse whether HANCI rankings simply reflect countries’ general profile of giving aid, 
and their overall commitment to development. 
3.1 HANCI Donor Index rankings 
This subsection sets out some important features of the HANCI Donor Index, to guide 
readers in their interpretation of the rankings that are presented in Chapter 3.2. 
 The HANCI aggregates relative (not absolute) political commitment levels. HANCI 
indicators are measured on ordinal, categorical and cardinal scales, and the index is 
therefore not able to meaningfully calculate absolute commitment levels aggregated 
across indicators. Instead, HANCI employs the Borda scoring technique to calculate 
scores for the Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) and Nutrition 
Commitment Index (NCI) sub-indices, and for the two themes that compose these 
(public expenditures; and policies, programmes and legal frameworks). Borda scoring 
respects the diversity of measurement scales, and thus allows the valid calculation of 
aggregate scores across indicators. Resultant Borda scores are translated in 
rankings. It is important to remember that the Borda scores do not represent absolute 
commitment levels; they represent relative political commitment levels. For this 
reason also, HANCI does not identify absolute benchmarks of commitment to be 
achieved. 
 The HANCI compares countries’ performance relative to one another. Consequently, 
a ranking emerges regardless of the (weak or strong) performance of countries. 
 Countries that show relatively high commitment levels in the HANCI do not 
necessarily perform strongly on each of the composite indicators. High rankings 
should not be a reason for complacency: often, there is substantial scope to enhance 
performance on selected indicators. 
 For each indicator, the presence of outliers (e.g. countries with significantly 
higher/lower scores than the nearest other country) depresses/inflates the normalised 
indicator scores for all other countries.31 It accordingly resonates when indicator 
scores are summed up at the theme level (see also the sensitivity analysis, Chapter 
4.1). 
 Absolute commitment levels can be ascertained for all individual indicators (not 
aggregations) by referring to the raw data (prior to normalisation) shown in the 
spreadsheet in Annex 3. 
 The HANCI rankings are planned to be recalculated in December 2013 and 2014. 
Over time, countries may improve their absolute performance on indicators, yet fail to 
improve their index rankings, when other countries’ improve at least just as fast. To 
prevent demotivation, we suggest that wherever absolute performance on indicators 
improves, this should be the benchmark (not country rankings). 
                                               
31
 This is, for example, the case for the indicator ODA to nutrition: fair share, where Luxembourg scores much higher than its 
nearest ‘rival’. 
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3.2 Key findings for the HANCI Donor Index 2012 
Table 3.1 below shows the overall rankings for the HANCI Donor Index 2012. It breaks up 
the countries into three clusters. Each cluster contains the sum of approximately one-third of 
all Borda points distributed between the 23 countries.32 Hence, as the leading countries have 
obtained the highest scores, there are fewer countries in the top group. 
Table 3.1 Total scores and groupings from the HANCI Donor Index 
  HANCI 
Score 
HRCI 
Score 
NCI  
Score 
HANCI 
Ranks 
HRCI 
Ranks 
NCI  
Ranks 
United Kingdom 78 34 44 1 4 1 
Canada 74 36 38 2 2 3 
Denmark 73 32 41 3 6 2 
Germany 65 29 36 4 9 5 
Ireland 61 31 30 5 7 8 
Sweden 59 21 38 6 14 3 
Belgium 58 27 31 7 11 6 
Spain 57 35 22 8 3 13 
Luxembourg 53 26 27 9 12 9 
Finland 52 37 15 10 1 20 
Norway 51 28 23 11 10 11 
France 50 25 25 12 13 10 
Australia 50 34 16 12 4 18 
Switzerland 48 30 18 14 8 15 
Japan 47 16 31 15 18 6 
Netherlands 43 20 23 16 16 11 
New Zealand 37 21 16 17 14 18 
Italy 29 10 19 18 21 14 
United States of America 29 12 17 18 20 17 
Greece 23 5 18 20 23 15 
Portugal 23 10 13 20 21 21 
Austria 23 17 6 20 17 22 
South Korea 22 16 6 23 18 22 
Green = leading on commitment (top 1/3rd) 
Orange = moderate commitment (middle 1/3rd) 
Red = relatively low commitment (bottom 1/3rd) 
The UK is among the leading countries in the fight against hunger and undernutrition. 
The United Kingdom has achieved the highest score out of 23 OECD countries for spending, 
policies and treaty commitments that could help to reduce hunger and undernutrition in 
developing countries. Just beating Canada and Denmark, the UK owes its high score in 
particular to its strong performance on policy, programme and legal indicators. It does well on 
supporting the SUN movement and biodiversity protecting agreements, and has relatively 
low levels of protection of domestic agricultural markets. In terms of spending, the UK has a 
strong record delivering on its commitments for nutrition; while its ODA for nutrition is not the 
highest, it has been stable and enduring over the past decade. However, the UK scores 
poorly when compared to other countries on several spending indicators: its levels of aid 
                                               
32
 Two principles are applied to demarcate four country groupings. First, each of the groups contains the nearest approximation 
of a third of all Borda points that were distributed in the scoring process. As such, groups with relatively higher commitment 
scores (based on aggregate Borda scores across themes and HRCI and NCI sub-indices) contain fewer countries. Second, 
countries with the same number of Borda points must be located in the same group. 
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funding for agricultural development, food security and climate change are comparatively 
low. 
Canada does well on policies, programmes and legal indicators. It supports the SUN 
movement, does well in terms of low protection of agricultural markets and setting relatively 
low biofuel blending mandates, and is among the top performers in terms of delivering on its 
greenhouse gas emission reduction pledges. Its performance on spending indicators is 
variable. Canada leads in terms of its enduringly stable financial support for agriculture and 
food security over the past decade. It also does fairly well on this for nutrition. However, 
Canada also shows weak spending performance on social protection and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. 
Denmark scores well for spending indicators. It gives a solid performance in terms of 
supporting nutrition (second highest of all countries), and this support is stable and enduring. 
It also invests well in climate change adaptation and mitigation. Spending support for climate 
change is not entirely coherent with policy action on this. Denmark does poorly in terms of 
delivering on its greenhouse gas emission reduction pledges, yet is leading on the 
development of domestic climate change adaptation strategies and plans. As an EU member 
state, Denmark’s biofuel mandates are among the highest. Denmark is a member of the SUN 
movement and does fairly well in terms of its relatively low protection of domestic agricultural 
markets (within the group of 23 OECD countries) and support for biodiversity agreements. 
Germany and Ireland complete the group of countries leading on commitment. Germany 
performs strongly on most policy, programme and legal framework indicators, somewhat 
contrasting with its scores on spending indicators. Ireland gains especially strong scores on 
biodiversity and endorsement of SUN, and is among the top donors investing in social 
protection. Ireland also shows enduring and stable financial support for agriculture and food 
security. 
South Korea, Portugal, Greece and Austria rank lowest on the HANCI Donor Index. 
South Korea is a relatively new donor. Its spending on hunger and nutrition is relatively low, 
and it is not a member of the SUN movement. However, it does fairly well in terms of offering 
stable and enduring financial support for agriculture and food security, it has relatively low 
biofuel mandates, and is putting policies in place to deal with climate change adaptation. 
While Greece and Portugal are in the throes of prolonged economic downturns and 
extremely vulnerable public finances, Austria is not. Austria invests relatively little in nutrition, 
agriculture and food security, social protection, and climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. Its investments in agriculture, food security and nutrition are not very stable over 
time. In terms of policy, Austrian biofuel mandates are among the highest (as an EU 
member). Austria does, however, do well in terms of relatively low agricultural protection and 
in putting in place strategies and plans to address climate change adaptation. 
Commitment to reducing hunger is not the same as commitment to reducing 
undernutrition 
Several countries score well on commitment to reduce hunger but poorly on commitment to 
reduce undernutrition, and vice versa (Figure 3.1), which translates into diverse rankings 
(Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.1 Donor countries’ hunger commitment and nutrition 
commitment scores 
 
Figure 3.2 Donor countries’ hunger commitment and nutrition 
commitment rankings 
 
For instance, Australia ranks 4th on the HRCI but 18th on the NCI; Finland is 1st on the 
HRCI but 20th on the NCI; while Sweden and Japan do much better on the NCI (3rd and 6th 
respectively) than on the HRCI (14th and 18th). This suggests that commitment to reducing 
hunger is not the same as having commitment to reducing undernutrition. However, 
differences in rankings are not as strongly pronounced as in the HANCI for developing 
countries (te Lintelo et al. 2013). 
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Good development partners could do more for hunger and nutrition. 
Table 3.2 shows what donor countries allocate to aid relative to their wealth (GNI). 
Table 3.2 Donor countries: HANCI rankings and aid spending relative 
to wealth (2011) 
 HANCI ranking ODA/GNI 
United Kingdom 1 0.56 
Canada 2 0.31 
Denmark 3 0.86 
Germany 4 0.4 
Ireland 5 0.52 
Sweden 6 1.02 
Belgium 7 0.53 
Spain 8 0.29 
Luxembourg 9 0.99 
Finland 10 0.52 
Norway 11 1 
Australia 12 0.35 
France 12 0.46 
Switzerland 14 0.46 
Japan 15 0.18 
Netherlands 16 0.75 
New Zealand 17 0.28 
Italy 18 0.19 
USA 18 0.2 
Austria 20 0.27 
Greece 20 0.11 
Portugal 20 0.29 
South Korea 23 0.12 
Notes: OECD http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/50060310.pdf  
Figure 3.3 shows that HANCI Donor Index rankings are weakly negatively correlated with 
countries’ aid spending expressed as a share of their wealth (ODA/GNI). This is expected, as 
public expenditure indicators make up half of all indicators in the HANCI Donor Index, and 
confirmed by the test statistic (the probability of an independent relation between the 
variables is 0.0005). 
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Figure 3.3 Donor countries: HANCI rankings and aid spending 
 
However, somewhat surprisingly, this relation reverses for the top half of countries ranked in 
HANCI (Figure 3.4). The graph suggests that for this group, commitment towards reduction 
of hunger and undernutrition is driven by their strong performance on policy, programme and 
legal framework indicators. Countries like the UK, Canada, Germany, and (to a lesser extent) 
Spain are not the biggest aid spenders (relative to GNI); however, they are championing the 
cause of hunger and nutrition. 
Figure 3.4 Donor countries: HANCI rankings and aid spending relative 
to wealth 
 
Is hunger and nutrition commitment the same as commitment to development at large? To 
assess this, Figure 3.5 compares rankings on the HANCI Donor Index with rankings on the 
Commitment to Development Index (CDI) (Roodman 2012). 
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Figure 3.5 Country rankings on the HANCI Donor Index and CDI 
 
The relationship between country rankings on the two indices is positive and statistically 
significant, at the 10 per cent level.33 
Figure 3.5 suggests that countries such as Norway and the Netherlands, who have a 
relatively good track record on international development yet are not in the top ten HANCI 
rankings, could do more for hunger and nutrition. Norway is a particularly interesting case. 
Even though it scores best among all countries on expenditure indicators, it scores much 
weaker on policies, programmes and legal frameworks indicators. Norway could thus 
enhance its HANCI rankings by improving its performance on indicators such as: 
unconditionally pledging and delivering on CO2 emissions; reforming its high levels of 
agricultural protection for domestic producers; giving greater support for global biodiversity 
protection; and by supporting the SUN movement. 
Within a climate of economic austerity, the government of the Netherlands has substantially 
cut ODA budgets between 2010 and 2012, from 0.8 per cent to 0.7 per cent of its GNI 
(NCDO 2012). In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which hosts the Department of 
Development Cooperation) had to implement cuts in the order of nearly 1 billion euros (21 
per cent of its ODA budget). The Netherlands does well on several counts, notably: full 
membership of the SUN movement; support for global biodiversity protection; having a 
climate change adaptation strategy; relatively low levels of domestic agricultural protection; 
and the endurance and stability of its ODA commitments to nutrition. However, while its ODA 
to nutrition as fair share is fairly high (comparable to the UK, for example), its disbursements 
record on this ODA is not strong; and this is also the case for its share of total ODA with 
gender objectives. Food security has recently been assigned one of the four aid priority 
themes of the Netherlands. This is reflected in a growing relative share of ODA to agriculture 
and food security in overall ODA, from 2.8 per cent in 2010 to 4.3 per cent in 2012. While this 
is encouraging, actual levels (expressed as fair share) remain lower than most other donors. 
Furthermore, over the past decade, substantial volatility in the share of aid for agriculture and 
food security has lowered the score of the Netherlands on this indicator. ODA to climate 
change (and social protection) as fair share are also relatively low. EU membership means 
that the Netherlands has the lowest score for biofuel blending mandates; it also does poorly 
on delivering on its CO2 emission reduction pledges. 
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 Figure 3.5 depicts CDI ranks recalculated for our sample of 23 OECD countries. 
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4 The empirical functioning of the index 
Although the HANCI employs a theory-driven approach to building the index, this section 
explores whether the index hangs together empirically, by ascertaining its internal reliability. 
The HANCI would be reliable if it ranks two countries with the same level of political 
commitment on a par with each other. In statistical terms, reliability is a measure of whether 
individual indicators in the HANCI produce results that are consistent with the overall HANCI. 
Arguably, the most commonly used measure of internal reliability is Cronbach’s alpha or the 
standardised version thereof. In cases such as the HANCI, where all indicators are 
normalised before being used in the index, the standardised version is recommended 
(Cortina 1993). Cronbach’s alpha is calculated as: 
 
where N is the number of indicators and M(COV) is the mean of inter-indicator covariance 
and SUM(VAR/COV) is the sum of all elements in the variance covariance matrix. The 
standardised Cronbach alpha, on the other hand, uses information from the correlation 
matrix instead of the variance covariance matrix. Therefore, we use the correlation matrix of 
the full set of indicators to calculate the standardised alpha. 
The calculation of the correlation matrix for all indicators needs to consider that the HANCI 
comprises a mix of indicators measured on ordinal and continuous scales. If all were 
continuous indicators, then we could have used Pearson moment correlation calculations to 
populate the correlation matrix that is needed to calculate the standardised alpha. However, 
the presence of ordinal variables requires that the calculation of correlation measures in each 
cell of the correlation matrix be determined as follows: 
 (ordinal multi categories, ordinal multi categories) → polychoric correlation 
 (ordinal two categories, ordinal two categories) → tetrachoric correlation 
 (continuous, ordinal multi categories) → polyserial correlation 
 (continuous, ordinal two categories) → biserial correlation 
 (continuous, continuous) → Pearson moment correlation 
The resulting heterogeneous correlation matrix is summarised in Figure 4.1 using a colour 
scheme. The legend illustrates the interpretation of the colours: from dark red (meaning 
perfectly negative correlation) to dark blue (meaning perfectly positive correlation). The figure 
groups indicators according to whether they represent the hunger reduction commitment 
sub-index (HRCI) or the nutrition commitment sub-index (NCI) components of the overall 
index. In addition, the upper triangular part of the figure identifies the statistically insignificant 
correlation values by crossing off the corresponding dots (at the 5 per cent level). For 
instance, even though the correlation between fair share ODA on social protection 
(odafs_sp) and biofuel blending targets (blending) is strongly negative, it is not statistically 
significant. In fact, Figure 4.1 emphasises that none of the negative correlation values are 
statistically significant. 
)/(
)(
 sCronbach'
2
COVVARSUM
COVMN 

34 
Figure 4.1 Heterogeneous correlation matrix 
 
Table 4.1 tabulates Cronbach’s alphas based on the heterogeneous correlation matrix for the 
HANCI and its sub-indices (HRCI and NCI). The alphas based on heterogeneous correlation 
matrices are identified in the table as ‘Modified α’ to distinguish them from regular alphas 
calculated from Pearson moment correlations, which assume that all indicators are 
continuous. Though both types of alphas are presented in the table for completeness, the 
modified version is more accurate as it uses accurate correlation type for all indicators based 
on their data types. 
Table 4.1 Cronbach’s alphas for HRCI, NCI and HANCI 
 Countries Indicators α Modified α 
HANCI 23 14 0.3985 0.4975 
HRCI 23 9 0.2289 0.2926 
NCI 23 5 0.1126 0.1278 
Researchers commonly use 0.7 as a rule of thumb cut-off value when using Cronbach’s 
alpha to determine the internal reliability within a set of indicators. Table 4.1 shows that 
HANCI’s modified α is lower than the 0.7 level and for sub-indices the modified αs are even 
lower. While it is good to keep this limitation in mind when using the HANCI, there are at 
least two reasons for not putting too much emphasis on the lower than 0.7 alpha. First, there 
is a substantial literature which argues against the blind application of the 0.7 cut-off value of 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cortina 1993; Schmitt 1996). This literature clearly shows that factors 
other than reliability affect alpha values. For instance, Cortina (1993) argues that Cronbach’s 
alpha declines with the number of underlying dimensions of the data. For example, 18 
indicators with an average intercorrelation of 0.3 would have an alpha of 0.88 if the data have 
just one dimension. However, alpha will decline to 0.64 when the dimensions of the data 
increase from 1 to 3 while retaining the average intercorrelation at the 0.3 level (Cortina 
1993). The HANCI currently considers that the theoretical construct of political commitment 
to reduce hunger and nutrition is hinged on at least two dimensions – hunger and 
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undernutrition – although conceivably a third dimension involves a commitment to reduce 
overnutrition. Second, even though we consider all elements of the correlation matrix in 
Figure 4.1 for calculating Cronbach’s alpha, many of those are not statistically significant. 
Figure 4.1 emphasises this by crossing off correlation values which are not significant at the 
5 per cent level. Notice that none of the negative correlations are significant. We point this 
out because the modified α for HANCI indicators goes up to 0.6885 if the calculations were 
done after replacing the negative correlation coefficients with zeros. 
4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is used to check the robustness of the index to choices about its 
components or construction. An index is robust if the rankings it generates do not vary 
substantively after small changes in composition or construction. We thus calculate the index 
in different ways and explore correlations between ranks. If the correlation between ranks 
(the Spearman rank) is high, then the index is said to be robust to the variation. 
Table 4.2 HANCI vs HANCI alternatives 
 Normalisation Weighting Aggregation level Aggregation method 
HANCI HDI Equal Theme Additive + Borda 
Alt 1 Standardise Equal Theme Additive + Borda 
Alt 2 HDI Equal Theme Borda + Borda 
Alt 3 HDI Equal Indicator Borda 
Alt 4 HDI Equal Indicator Additive 
Alt 5 HDI PCA Indicator Additive 
Alt 6 HDI Factor Analysis Indicator Additive 
We tested the robustness of the HANCI by comparing it with six alternative ways of 
constructing the index (Table 4.2). The HANCI was built with HDI-type normalisation and 
equally weighted thematic aggregation to produce index scores based on an additive plus 
Borda method. These choices are tabulated in the first row of Table 4.2. The rest of the table 
presents a few of the other ways this index could have been compiled had we made different 
design choices. 
The six alternative specifications presented in Table 4.2 are: 
1. Where the normalisation of indicators is done using standardisation (Z scores); 
2. Where indicators within each theme are aggregated using the Borda method instead 
of the additive method used in the HANCI; 
3. Where aggregation is done at the indicator level using the Borda method (in this case 
themes are not considered); 
4. Where indicators are aggregated using the additive method; 
5. Where PCA identifies weights for calculating the index; 
6. Where factor analysis-based weights are used in aggregating the indicator. 
Our PCA results suggest that there are five principal components for the 14 indicators. We 
selected five components with the support of the scree plot, λ>1 criterion, and explained 
proportion of variance being greater than 10 per cent. The factor analysis, on the other hand, 
supported the idea that there are four underlying factors. 
If the HANCI is sensitive to design changes, then we expect country ranks to change as a 
result (Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3 Comparison of country ranks – HANCI vs alternative design 
options 
 HANCI Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Alt 4 Alt 5 Alt 6 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 7 4 
Canada 2 2 3 4 2 13 2 
Denmark 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 
Germany 4 4 6 10 4 3 1 
Ireland 5 5 7 8 6 10 14 
Sweden 6 5 4 7 10 5 6 
Belgium 7 7 9 12 12 8 8 
Spain 8 7 5 3 9 9 11 
Luxembourg 9 10 16 14 8 4 7 
Finland 10 9 7 5 7 6 10 
Norway 11 11 13 6 5 1 5 
Australia 12 11 11 8 11 12 13 
France 12 13 12 13 14 14 9 
Switzerland 14 14 15 15 13 16 20 
Japan 15 16 14 16 17 21 16 
Netherlands 16 14 9 11 15 11 12 
New Zealand 17 16 17 17 16 15 17 
Italy 18 18 18 19 20 19 15 
USA 18 19 19 18 18 20 18 
Greece 20 20 21 22 23 22 22 
Portugal 20 21 21 21 21 18 19 
Austria 20 21 20 20 19 17 21 
South Korea 23 23 23 23 22 23 23 
 
Spearman r  0.9943* 0.9309* 0.8886* 0.9446* 0.7882* 0.8852* 
Note: *Significant at 5 per cent level. 
Table 4.3 tabulates the HANCI ranks as well as the ranks based on the above alternative 
indices. The rankings of HANCI with these alternative rankings are then compared and 
summarised using Spearman rank correlation coefficients, which assess the degree of 
correspondence between rankings. The rank correlations are all above 0.7, which confirms 
that the ranks are robust for all changes discussed here (all of these are significant at the 5 
per cent level). 
As high Spearman correlations can occur in conjunction with significant re-rankings 
(Ravallion 2010), we also assessed how design choices affect country re-rankings. As 
expected, the lower the Spearman correlation coefficient of alternative design options, the 
greater variation in country ranks. Alternative 1 in particular is highly robust. 
It is, however, apparent that the HANCI rankings seem most sensitive to decisions around 
weights, specifically by means of a PCA and by factor analysis. This is brought out more 
clearly in Figure 4.2, where the horizontal bars indicate the HANCI rankings and dots the 
alternative rankings. The black dots are the rankings for the alternative aggregation and 
standardisation methods (Alt 1 to Alt 4 in Table 4.3). The white dots are the rankings for 
when the weighting assumption is changed from equal to either PCA-based or factor 
analysis-based (Alt 5 and Alt 6 in Table 4.3). For the majority of countries, ranks based on 
changed weights generate the largest deviation from the HANCI ranks. 
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Figure 4.2 HANCI rank (black bar) vs the ranks of alternative design 
choices 
 
The finding that the HANCI may be sensitive to changed weights emphasised the need to 
revisit the issue of unbalanced indicator weights assigned by the HANCI Donor Index (see 
Table 2.7). It is particularly important to assess the sensitivity of the HANCI to changes in 
indicators that are weighted heavier compared to others. Table 2.7 showed that two 
indicators were weighted highest: SUN membership and ODA with gender policy objective. 
We conducted a further test to assess the sensitivity of the HANCI to changes in the second 
of these indicators. 
The test arbitrarily assigned alternative standardised values to the indicator on ‘ODA with 
gender policy objective’ in each country. The values given were 1; 0.75; 0.5; 0.25; and 0. 
Since all 23 countries were given these five alternative values, this yielded a total of 
23×5=125 alternative HANCI rankings. Figure 4.3 (below) summarises the sensitivity of each 
country’s ranks to changed values for its ODA with gender policy objective indicator. Overall, 
the picture is that there are no large deviations in the country ranks. For instance, top 10 
HANCI countries will not move to the bottom ten when alternative values are assigned to the 
ODA with gender indicator. Similarly, the bottom ten countries hardly move. The sensitivity of 
ranks to this change is more concentrated in the mid-ranked HANCI countries. In summary, 
this evidence suggests that the HANCI is robust to changes in its highest weighted indicator. 
It can be argued, therefore, that the HANCI would be even more robust to changes in other, 
lower weighted indicators. 
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Figure 4.3 Sensitivity of HANCI rankings to value changes in highly 
weighted indicators 
 
To sum up, when employing alternative ranking and normalisation procedures, for donor 
countries, we find Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients that are close to one another 
across the various components and that are always significant. We conclude that the HANCI 
rankings are, therefore, robust. 
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5 HANCI findings drawing on primary data 
This section discusses the results from the web-based perception surveys conducted with 
hunger and undernutrition experts in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Commitment scores were calculated on the basis of respondents’ answers in a questionnaire 
using fixed answer categories (see Chapter 2.4 on methodology). Multiple questions were 
designed to capture each of the 11 aspects of commitment identified by Brinkerhoff (2000). 
Scores on each are calculated by question (as a mean score over all respondents) and 
across multiple questions to combine into an indicator score (as a mean of means). 
Scores are to be interpreted as follows: 
1 = very strong commitment 
2 = strong commitment 
3 = moderate commitment 
4 = weak commitment 
5 = very weak commitment 
The expert surveys were devised to obtain a perspective on the political commitment of 
donors that would complement the secondary data-based index rankings. Their results are 
not fully comparable. The index rankings compare a country relative to other OECD–DAC 
donors, whereas the surveys assess the country’s performance against an implicit (and 
unmeasured) standard of expectation held by the experts. Where relevant, the report reflects 
on commonalities and differences in findings emerging from the two approaches. 
The following subsections present country-wise summaries of findings. 
5.1 Germany 
 ODA/GNI (2011): 0.4 per cent 
 ODA to nutrition (2011): $155m 
 ODA to agriculture and food security (2011): $798m 
 HRCI rank: 9 (out of 23) 
 NCI rank: 5 (out of 23) 
 HANCI rank: 4 (out of 23) 
Promoting agriculture and sustainable development in rural areas and protecting natural 
resources is a key goal of German development cooperation (GIZ 2013). Nutrition appears to 
be subsumed in an agricultural development and food security agenda. 
Overall, the expert perception survey scores (Table 5.1) suggest that the German 
government’s commitment to hunger and undernutrition reduction is of moderate strength, 
and that it is somewhat more committed to hunger reduction (2.86) than to improving 
nutrition (3.29). 
Breaking down the score for the various commitment aspects, however, allows for a more 
fine-grained analysis. Table 5.1 shows some interesting differences. First, the range of 
scores is greater for hunger reduction than for nutrition commitment. Second, except for the 
locus of initiative, Germany’s hunger commitment is considered greater than nutrition 
commitment for each indicator. For nutrition, Germany has moderate to fairly weak 
commitment scores for each of the aspects measured. In contrast, the German aid effort is 
deemed fairly strong for various aspects of hunger reduction commitment (intention and 
40 
action; on the openness and clearness of stating its intent addressing hunger and 
undernutrition; and also on its analytical rigour, learning and adaptation of programmes). 
Table 5.1 Expert perceptions of Germany’s commitment to reduce 
hunger and undernutrition 
Indicator Hunger Nutrition 
Analytical rigour 2.51 3.03 
Coherence domestic – aid policy 3.22 3.62 
Continuity of effort 3.00 3.36 
Credible incentives 3.80 3.97 
Donor aid expenditure 3.04 3.61 
Government intention and action 2.46 3.02 
Institutional coordination 2.74 3.19 
Learning and adaptation 2.58 3.06 
Locus of initiative 3.18 3.18 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 2.41 3.19 
Public commitment 2.48 2.99 
 
Mean 2.86 3.29 
The experts deem institutional incentives – in terms of providing penalties and rewards for 
programming efforts that fail or succeed in achieving hunger reduction or improved nutrition 
outcomes – to be weak. The German aid effort regarding the mobilisation of stakeholders on 
hunger issues, domestically and in recipient countries, is deemed fairly strong, though 
notably less so for nutrition. The survey suggests that Germany shows more leadership on 
hunger than on nutrition issues. 
5.2 Ireland 
 ODA/GNI (2011): 0.52 per cent 
 ODA to nutrition (2011): $18m 
 ODA to agriculture and food security (2011): $70m 
 HRCI rank: 7 (out of 23) 
 NCI rank: 8 (out of 23) 
 HANCI rank: 5 (out of 23) 
Ireland, while being a relatively small donor (in absolute money terms), positions itself as a 
leading donor on hunger issues. It presented the Hunger Task Force Report in 2008 and 
continues to put hunger and nutrition at the centre of its international aid efforts. For instance, 
its 2013 EU Presidency was inaugurated by a two-day conference in Dublin highlighting 
hunger, climate change and social justice issues. Irish Aid is currently developing a policy 
White Paper that gives a prominent role to hunger and nutrition. 
The survey findings (Table 5.2) show that the experts consider Ireland to be doing fairly 
strongly on both hunger commitment (2.59) and nutrition commitment (2.61). It is also 
remarkable that scores for hunger and nutrition commitment on the same commitment 
indicator are strikingly similar. Ireland is given strong commitment scores for its aid 
expenditure, its promotion of institutional coordination, and its intention and action. 
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Table 5.2 Expert perceptions of Ireland’s commitment to reduce hunger 
and undernutrition 
Indicator Hunger Nutrition 
Analytical rigour 2.35 2.36 
Coherence domestic – aid policy 3.96 3.89 
Continuity of effort 2.61 2.67 
Credible incentives 3.35 3.35 
Donor aid expenditure 2.06 2.24 
Government intention and action 2.16 2.14 
Institutional coordination 2.09 2.06 
Learning and adaptation 2.44 2.40 
Locus of initiative 2.42 2.58 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 2.75 2.57 
Public commitment 2.32 2.41 
 
Mean 2.59 2.61 
However, the experts identified one significant dissonant: Ireland’s domestic policy and aid 
policy lack coherence. Thus, experts consider that Ireland’s efforts in reducing CO2 
emissions, its positioning in international trade negotiations and in subsidising Irish farmers 
are not conducive to reducing hunger and undernutrition in developing countries. 
5.3 The Netherlands 
 ODA/GNI (2011): 0.75 per cent 
 ODA to nutrition (2011): $110m 
 ODA to agriculture and food security (2011): $180m 
 HRCI rank: 16 (out of 23) 
 NCI rank: 11 (out of 23) 
 HANCI rank: 16 (out of 23) 
Among the surveyed countries, the Netherlands is the only one that has a history of 
allocating aid that exceeds the international benchmark of 0.7 per cent of GNI. Nevertheless, 
within a climate of continued economic austerity, ODA is now under substantial pressure in 
the Netherlands. As noted earlier, the government has substantially cut ODA budgets 
between 2010 and 2012, from 0.8 per cent to 0.7 per cent of its GNI (NCDO 2012). However, 
while the overall portfolio is shrinking, the share of ODA to food security and nutrition is 
increasing, as these themes have recently been assigned as aid priorities. 
Overall, the experts considered that the Netherlands demonstrated a moderate level of 
commitment to addressing hunger and undernutrition in developing countries in 2012. 
Commitment levels were consistently assessed as higher for hunger than for nutrition, for 
each of the 11 indicators (Table 5.3). 
ODA spending on hunger and nutrition is deemed to be of moderate strength. The 
Netherlands was given fairly strong commitment scores for intention and action and locus of 
initiative, (indicating the flexibility the Dutch aid agency’s country offices have to support 
context-sensitive programmes). Dutch policies are fairly strongly in expressing hunger and 
nutrition as its aid objectives, albeit more strongly so for hunger (public commitment). 
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Table 5.3 Expert perceptions of the Netherlands’ commitment to reduce 
hunger and undernutrition 
Indicator Hunger Nutrition 
Analytical rigour 2.77 3.02 
Coherence domestic – aid policy 3.23 3.55 
Continuity of effort 3.06 3.19 
Credible incentives 4.15 4.37 
Donor expenditure 2.77 3.04 
Government intention and action 2.36 2.72 
Institutional coordination 2.93 3.21 
Learning and adaptation 2.69 2.90 
Locus of initiative 2.5 2.6 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.21 3.54 
Public commitment 2.55 2.85 
 
Mean score 2.95 3.20 
The experts noted that the Netherlands does not play a particularly strong role in mobilising 
domestic and international stakeholders around hunger and nutrition agendas. Finally, 
institutional incentives – in terms of providing penalties and rewards for programming efforts 
that fail or succeed in achieving hunger reduction or improved nutrition outcomes – are 
considered to be weak. 
5.4 The United Kingdom 
 ODA/GNI (2011): 0.56 per cent 
 ODA to nutrition (2011): $414m 
 ODA to agriculture and food security (2011): $568m 
 HRCI rank: 4 (out of 23) 
 NCI rank: 1 (out of 23) 
 HANCI rank: 1 (out of 23) 
The UK has recently shown substantial international leadership in bringing hunger and 
nutrition higher on to development agendas. It has an important role in the SUN movement, 
and recently organised high-level meetings focusing on hunger and nutrition. Most notably, at 
the end of the London Olympics in 2012, Prime Minister David Cameron organised the UK 
Hunger Summit, and in June 2013 a pre-G8 Nutrition for Growth event was organised at 
which various bilateral, multilateral, philanthropic and private donors made substantial 
financial commitments to address hunger and undernutrition. 
Given the above, it is somewhat surprising to find that, overall, the experts assessed the UK 
as having a little less than moderate commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. For all 
11 indicators, scores on hunger commitment were better than for nutrition commitment 
(Table 5.4). 
The UK scores best on the government intention and action indicator, which reflects the 
extent to which it gives attention to, prioritises and speaks out on hunger and nutrition issues. 
The second best score is given to the locus of initiative indicator, reflecting that experts 
considered DFID country offices to have reasonable flexibility to initiate and adjust 
headquarter strategies and programmes to suit local contexts, enhancing their ownership. 
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Table 5.4 Expert perceptions of the UK’s commitment to reduce hunger 
and undernutrition 
Indicator Hunger Nutrition 
Analytical rigour 2.93 3.05 
Coherence domestic – aid policy 4.14 4.18 
Continuity of effort 3.21 3.38 
Credible incentives 4.00 4.30 
Donor aid expenditure 2.99 3.34 
Government intention and action 2.68 2.86 
Institutional coordination 2.92 3.06 
Learning and adaptation 3.06 3.23 
Locus of initiative 2.80 2.89 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.46 3.67 
Public commitment 2.92 3.29 
 
Mean 3.19 3.39 
Nevertheless, on many indicators, the UK gets moderate commitment scores, and on some 
indicators is assessed as showing weak commitment. Experts were not convinced that the 
UK government has sufficiently institutionalised incentives that reward and sanction 
individuals and bodies like DFID for their performance in hunger reduction (credible 
incentives). Experts were most critical with respect to the UK’s lack of coherence between 
domestic policy and aid policy. Thus, experts consider that the UK’s efforts to reduce CO2 
emissions, its positioning in international trade negotiations and its subsidising of farmers are 
not conducive to reducing hunger and undernutrition in developing countries. 
It may seem incongruous that UK-based experts are quite critical of the government’s 
commitment to reducing hunger and undernutrition in developing countries, while the HANCI 
Donor Index ranks the UK ranks highest of all 23 OECD countries assessed. However, it is 
worth reiterating that the survey and the HANCI Donor Index do not measure the same 
things, and hence are not comparable.34 However, one common finding that arose from the 
separate analyses of the index rankings and expert surveys is that much more can be done 
by the UK and other countries if they are to show consistently strong commitment to reduce 
hunger and undernutrition. 
                                               
34
 The index rankings compare the UK relative to other OECD–DAC donors, whereas the surveys assess the UK performance 
against an implicit (and unmeasured) standard of expectation held by the experts. It is theoretically possible that experts in 
different countries hold different standards of expectation, with UK experts being particularly demanding. Moreover, the expert 
surveys may be driven by the composition of the sample of participating experts. We therefore do not present a comparative 
overview of expert assessments by country. 
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6 Conclusions 
 The HANCI Donor Index attempts to measure donor government commitment to 
reducing hunger and improving nutrition because this is something they can be held 
accountable to. The existence of a commitment score helps civil society hold donor 
governments to account. 
 
 We have provided two methods for assessing commitment: cross-country, using 
secondary data; and within country, relying on primary data for community and 
‘expert’ opinion. The primary data provide a complementary and up-to-date 
perspective on political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition, as they 
interrogate a set of commitment indicators for which no secondary data are available 
for a range of countries. 
 
 Hunger and undernutrition are two related but distinct concepts and we accordingly 
calculate a commitment index for each. 
 
 We have been rigorous and thorough in our methodological approach, being 
transparent about the choices we have made and the basis for those choices. We 
have conducted statistical tests and other sensitivity analyses to assess the 
consequences of our choices. These allow us to be confident that the HANCI 
methods and findings are robust. 
 
 The HANCI compares donor countries’ performance relative to one another, and 
aggregates relative (not absolute) political commitment levels. It does not identify 
absolute benchmarks of commitment to be achieved. However, absolute commitment 
levels can be ascertained for all individual indicators (not aggregations) by referring to 
the raw data (Annex 3). Countries that show relatively high commitment levels in the 
HANCI Donor Index do not necessarily perform strongly on each of the composite 
indicators. High rankings should not be a reason for complacency; often, there is still 
substantial scope for countries to enhance performance on selected indicators. 
 
 For the country rankings based on secondary data, we find that the UK, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany and Ireland are leading in the fight against hunger and 
undernutrition. 
 
 The UK has achieved the highest score out of 23 OECD countries for spending, 
policies and treaty commitments that could help to reduce hunger and undernutrition 
in developing countries. Just beating Canada and Denmark, the UK owes its high 
score in particular to its strong performance on policy, programme and legal 
indicators. 
 
 Commitment to reducing hunger is not the same as commitment to reducing 
undernutrition. Several countries score well on commitment to reduce hunger but 
poorly on commitment to reduce undernutrition, and vice versa. For instance, 
Australia is ranked 4th on the HRCI but 18th on the NCI; Finland is 1st on the HRCI 
but 20th on the NCI; while Sweden and Japan do much better on the NCI (3rd and 
6th respectively) than on the HRCI (14th and 18th). 
 
 South Korea, Portugal, Greece and Austria rank lowest on the HANCI Donor Index. 
 
 Good development partners could do more for hunger and nutrition. Donors 
championing the cause of hunger and nutrition are not necessarily the biggest 
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spenders. The ten highest HANCI donor rankings are not strongly correlated with the 
share of GNI given as aid. This also suggests that countries that have a relatively 
good track record on international development like France, Norway, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, who are not in the top ten HANCI rankings, could do more to tackle 
hunger and nutrition. 
 
 Country-based experts considered that: 
o The Irish government shows fairly strong commitment for both hunger and 
undernutrition reduction; 
o The governments of Germany and the Netherlands have moderate 
commitment to tackling hunger and undernutrition, although commitment to 
hunger reduction is somewhat stronger than commitment to improving 
nutrition; 
o The strength of the UK government’s commitment to reducing hunger and 
undernutrition in developing countries is somewhat less than moderate. 
 
 The primary research was not designed to enable comparisons across countries or to 
validate cross-country rankings. 
 
 Donor countries have a key role to play in reducing hunger and undernutrition in the 
high burden developing countries; their commitment needs to be monitored, and they 
need to be held accountable for their commitment to reducing hunger and 
undernutrition. 
 
Will commitment indices help to inspire greater political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition and ultimately contribute to bringing down hunger and undernutrition levels 
globally? The next phase of the HANCI project will undertake econometric work for the 
secondary data index and follow-up fieldwork for the primary data index with partners in 
selected countries. For it to be worth collecting the data and drawing up the indices, we must 
be able to show that they contribute to efforts to build commitment to end the twin scandals 
of global hunger and undernutrition. 
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Annex 1 Media reporting on HANCI Donor 
Index (June 2013) 
Background 
The second set of data from the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index – focusing on 
donor commitment to reducing hunger and undernutrition – was released on 4 June 2013. 
The data were launched at a Westminster event and promoted through traditional and social 
media outreach. The launch came at the start of a busy ‘nutrition week’ for the development 
community, with The Lancet publishing its Nutrition Series, and the Nutrition for Growth 
global summit. HANCI and IDS nutrition expertise in general was promoted in this context. 
This is a round-up of communications outputs and influencing impact from the first week 
following the launch of HANCI’s donor data. 
HANCI communications outputs 
IDS Central Communications and Knowledge Services worked closely with the lead 
researcher to produce a number of communications tools. These were designed to promote 
HANCI to target audiences such as donor country politicians and development professionals, 
to raise the index’s profile and to make its findings more accessible to non-specialists. 
HANCI communications outputs included: 
 HANCI website: www.hancindex.org  
 Animation: www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=PKv6G0Zw4UI  
 Press release and website story: www.ids.ac.uk/news/uk-amongst-top-donors-for-
reducing-hunger-and-undernutrition-in-developing-countries  
 Infographic: www.hancindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Donor-Index-
infographic-FINAL.pdf  
 Development Horizons blog post: www.developmenthorizons.com/2013/06/hanci-for-
donors-transparency-in.html  
 Westminster event: www.ids.ac.uk/events/what-can-the-uk-do-to-help-put-an-end-to-
the-current-nutrition-crisis  
 Email news update 
 Live tweeting from Westminster event. 
Media coverage 
HANCI received 20 media and blog mentions from a range of news and development outlets 
including The Guardian, All Africa, and Duncan Green’s From Poverty to Power blog 
(Oxfam).  
The index also received an official response from Irish Aid, with a press release quoting 
Ireland’s Minister for Trade and Development, Joe Costello: 
‘I very much welcome the recent Report by the Institute of Development Studies and 
am pleased to see Ireland’s strong ranking. This is testament to our active and 
prominent role in addressing the joint challenges of hunger and undernutrition.’ 
IDS also featured prominently in coverage of The Lancet Nutrition Series and the Nutrition for 
Growth summit, with Director Lawrence Haddad being widely quoted and interviewed. 
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Table A1.1 HANCI media and online mentions (4–14 June 2013) 
Date Outlet Type URL 
4 May All Africa News http://allafrica.com/stories/201306041467.html  
4 May Big News 
Network 
News www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/214976736/sca
t/c1ab2109a5bf37ec  
4 May Kenya Star News www.kenyastar.com/index.php/sid/214976736/scat/c1ab
2109a5bf37ec  
5 June From Poverty 
to Power 
Blog www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=14871  
5 June All Africa News http://allafrica.com/stories/201306100565.html  
5 June Charity 
Times 
Online magazine www.charitytimes.com/ct/UK_ranked_amongst_donors_
with_strongest_commitment_to_reducing_hunger.php  
5 June HEART Online development 
network 
www.heart-resources.org/mmedia/hunger-and-nutrition-
commitment-index-hanci/  
5 June Nieuwsbank News (Dutch) www.nieuwsbank.nl/inp/2013/06/05/Y087.htm  
5 June Oxfam Novib Blog (Dutch) www.oxfamnovib.nl/NL-scoort-slecht-op-aanpak-
honger.html  
5 June Kepa Civil society network 
(Finnish) 
www.kepa.fi/uutiset/10032  
5 June All Africa News http://allafrica.com/stories/201306100565.html  
6 June Transform 
Nutrition 
Online development 
network 
www.developmenthorizons.com/2013/06/hanci-for-
donors-transparency-in.html  
7 June The 
Guardian 
Online ‘food game’ 
used headline 
findings from HANCI 
www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/interactive/2013/jun/07/food-game-what-
do-you-know  
7 June All Africa News http://allafrica.com/stories/201306070404.html  
10 June All Africa News http://allafrica.com/stories/201306101396.html  
10 June Irish Aid Government www.irishaid.gov.ie/news-
publications/press/pressreleasearchive/2013/june/irelan
ds-role-in-fight-against-hunger/  
11 June The 
Guardian 
News www.guardian.co.uk/global-development-professionals-
network/2013/jun/11/uk-nutrition-summit-flaws  
11 June HEART Blog www.heart-resources.org/blog/nutrition-and-industrial-
action-thoughts-on-the-current-situation-in-mozambique/  
11 June CTA Newsletter/blog http://brussels.cta.int/index.php?option=com_k2&id=775
3:uk-amongst-top-donors-for-reducing-undernutrition-
&view=item&Itemid=54  
12 June Instituto Lula Website interview 
(Brazil) 
http://www.institutolula.org/so-com-comprometimento-
politico-a-fome-sera-erradicada-no-
mundo/#.UePXlj772tc  
14 June Voice of 
Russia 
Radio http://english.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/25298789/221967
970/  
Beyond the 20 specific HANCI media mentions, IDS received extensive media coverage 
during ‘nutrition week’. This raised the profile of the Institute and our nutrition research, and 
was an opportunity to push our accountability messaging which lies at the heart of the 
HANCI project. The media coverage included mentions in key UK newspapers such as the 
Financial Times and the Daily Telegraph, in development news outlets such as Relief Web, 
IRIN and Reuters’ AlertNet, and an interview with IDS Director Lawrence Haddad on BBC 
Radio 5 Live’s ‘Wake Up to Money’ programme, which was then re-broadcast on 14 regional 
BBC stations across the UK. 
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HANCI social media engagement 
HANCI was particularly successful in engaging key influencers through social media – such 
as politicians (including a number at ministerial level) as well as leaders in development 
advocacy and policy. 
For example, Julian Fantino, Canada’s Minister of International Cooperation, tweeted 
Canada’s HANCI score. This was followed up by the Canadian government’s Nutrition 
Coordinator contacting IDS directly to get the full data. 
Similarly, the Head of Food Security and Financial Sector at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
the Netherlands, Marcel Beukeboom, tweeted: 
Marcel Beukeboom @MBeukeboom 
@IDS_UK #HANCI disappointing 16th place for Netherlands. We are more ambitious than 
that. Interested in indicators to learn how to improve. 
This may have been in response to an article published by Oxfam Novib on the Netherlands’ 
poor performance in the index. This was followed up by the Senior Policy Advisor on Food 
and Nutrition Security in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacting IDS directly for more 
information on the data with the aim of improving the Netherlands’ ranking next year. 
Other key influencers include: the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD), who will use the HANCI data to encourage the Norwegian government to do more 
on nutrition; global development NGOs such as ONE, Concern, ACF and the IF campaign; 
as well as leading policy specialists such as Duncan Green (Oxfam), Brendan Cox (Save the 
Children) and Glen Tarman (Action Against Hunger/ACF). 
Tweets and retweets about the HANCI donor data from key Twitter influencers helped 
increase Twitter activity and the potential audience for HANCI. The top five tweets and 
retweets alone received more than 134,000 potential impressions. 
The HANCI infographic was particularly popular with Twitter followers and was the top 
HANCI tweet, with 11 retweets. 
HANCI was also shared through the IDS Facebook page. HANCI Facebook posts received a 
total of 30 shares, with 104 people talking about the index and its findings. 
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Table A1.2 Top ten most-followed Twitter users who shared, retweeted or 
mentioned IDS relating to the HANCI campaign 
Influential users  Followers Profile description 
@ONECampaign 699,643 ONE is a grassroots advocacy and campaigning organisation  
@DFID_UK 96,337 Department for International Development (DFID) 
@TwitChange  43,062 @Mashable Award Winner – We are how celebrities, fans and brands 
use social media for social good! 
@ifpri 23,150 The International Food Policy Research Institute seeks sustainable 
solutions for ending hunger and poverty. 
@enoughfoodif 23,067 Imagine IF we could be the generation to end hunger 
@reliefweb 22,765 Informing humanitarians worldwide. A service provided by @UNOCHA 
@Concern 22,043 Working with the world’s poorest people to transform their lives. And 
we tweet. concernworldwide.org 
@food4thehungry 15,888 International relief and development organisation that answers God’s 
call to meet the physical and spiritual need of the impoverished. 
@fp2p 10,830 Duncan Green – From Poverty to Power blog links and tweets from 
Oxfam's Senior Strategic Advisor 
@thomasbrake50
m 
10,121 Tom Brake MP – Lib Dem MP (UK) for Carshalton and Wallington, 
Deputy Leader of the House of Commons. Carshalton and Wallington 
 
Table A1.3 Top five tweets and retweets by @IDS_UK 
Text Retweets Replies Potential 
impressions 
#infographic shows all 23 donor countries' performance on 
political commitment to reduce #hunger #undernutrition 
http://t.co/dCugiOY1ZV  
11 1 48,430 
Listen to IDS director @l_haddad interview on BBC R5 
iplayer (27m 10s) on @EnoughFoodIF #hunger summit 
http://t.co/F3HPQUqOEn  
4 1 26,285 
Watch our new video 'What do we know' teasing the 
#HANCI results later today http://t.co/5sPjPU3iUn #hunger 
#undernutrition #globaldev 
5 1 21,990 
Ending #nutrition crisis tomorrow in Portcullis House with 
@l_haddad @APPG_Ag_F4D @devinitorg @ACF_UK 
http://t.co/5AkoG1WQ5F via @sharethis 
2 0 19,271 
Cameron: Aid spending makes PM 'proud to be British' 
http://t.co/FixsJfQvyT But how committed is UK? Find out 
here http://t.co/ofZNlGsIF3  
1 0 18,926 
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Table A1.4 Facebook: rated by PTAT (people talking about this) 
Post Text PTAT Total 
reach 
Total 
impressions 
Engaged 
users 
Post 
likes 
Post 
comments 
Post 
shares 
See where the 23 donor 
countries rank in terms of 
their performance on 14 
indicators of political 
commitment to reduce 
hunger and undernutrition 
48 3,576 7,289 246 27 4 18 
We're rather pleased with our 
new video 'What do we 
know?' which teases the 
HANCI results to be released 
at 4pm today. Let us know 
what you think and please 
share with your friends and 
colleagues. 
25 2,140 4,637 56 13 0 10 
The Lancet has published its 
much anticipated new Series 
of papers on maternal and 
child undernutrition, just days 
before the UK hosted Hunger 
Summit and G8, providing 
startling new estimates of the 
numbers of children dying 
from malnutrition every year, 
and outlining how the 
persistent burden of 
malnutrition can be tackled. 
15 1,387 3,220 37 12 0 2 
We have some exciting news 
tomorrow at 16:00 UK time. 
Find out which countries are 
donating more than others for 
commitment on hunger and 
undernutrition. 
10 3,950 8,021 19 10 0 0 
Listen to IDS Director 
Lawrence Haddad being 
interviewed on BBC Radio 5 
on Enough Food IF campaign 
and hunger summit. Forward 
the BBC iplayer to 27 mins 
10 secs for the start of the 
interview. 
3 811 1,993 8 2 0 0 
If you're unable to view the 
infographic see the HANCI 
website 
2 1,496 3,291 32 2 0 0 
UK amongst top donors for 
reducing hunger and 
undernutrition in developing 
countries. See which other 
countries rank well 
1 1,090 2,546 11 1 0 0 
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HANCI animation 
IDS worked with Bliink to create the animation ‘Hunger and Nutrition: What do we know?’, 
which was designed as an introduction to the HANCI and the need for accountability on 
hunger and undernutrition. 
The film was screened at the Westminster event at which the HANCI donor data were 
launched and was promoted through IDS social media channels. After one week, the 
animation had had 866 views and has been popular on Twitter, with 81 tweets sharing the 
link. 
Table A1.5 YouTube views 
Monday 
3rd June 
Tuesday 
4th June 
Wednesday 
5th June 
Thursday 
6th June 
Friday  
7th June 
Total  
(at 12 Jun) 
Comments Link 
tweeted 
12 243 170 120 87 866 3 positive 81 
In the first week, the animation was mainly viewed in donor countries as promotion focused 
on donor data and was aimed at audiences in donor countries. The animation will be used to 
further promote HANCI’s developing country data to NGOs and civil society working in 
developing countries in the coming months. 
Table A1.6 Top 20 countries viewing YouTube video 
Country Views Estimated minutes 
watched 
 Country Views Estimated minutes 
watched 
1 United Kingdom 300 582 11 Sweden 14 23 
2 United States 105 227 12 Spain 13 46 
3 Canada 52 135 13 South Africa 13 19 
4 India 30 81 14 Mexico 12 22 
5 Germany 26 53 15 France 12 10 
6 Italy 23 42 16 Netherlands 11 23 
7 Australia 18 44 17 Taiwan 10 109 
8 Ireland 15 23 18 Indonesia 9 21 
9 Belgium 15 50 19 Switzerland 8 10 
10 Nepal 15 29 20 New Zealand 8 26 
HANCI website traffic (all data based on 1 June to 11 June 2013) 
 Website traffic peaked on Wednesday 5 June at 249 visits. 
 Good ‘bounce rate’ – shows people are reading content and exploring site. 
 Irish visitors have highest visit duration, averaging at over 8 minutes. 
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Figure A1.1 Website traffic 
 
Top 10 countries where visitors came from 
Country/Territory Visits Pages/Visit Avg. Visit Duration % New Visits Bounce Rate 
United Kingdom 172 2.47 00:03:06 69.77% 47.09% 
United States 153 2.06 00:02:03 54.90% 52.29% 
Netherlands 100 2.55 00:03:55 56.00% 45.00% 
Belgium 46 2.43 00:02:30 84.78% 36.96% 
Italy 43 2.65 00:02:40 72.09% 44.19% 
Canada 39 1.85 00:02:13 71.79% 46.15% 
India 36 2.06 00:02:12 47.22% 69.44% 
Germany 33 2.73 00:03:06 81.82% 27.27% 
Ireland 33 2.88 00:08:49 48.48% 27.27% 
Australia 24 2.17 00:01:18 58.33% 50.00% 
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Table A1.7 Top ten pages viewed on HANCI website 
Page Pageviews Unique 
Pageviews 
Entrances Bounce 
rate 
% Exit 
/(homepage) 821 620 580 43.45% 44.58% 
/explore-the-data/hanci-infographics/ 427 272 151 48.34% 48.71% 
/explore-the-data/ 227 157 21 52.38% 16.74% 
/2013/06/new-hanci-donor-index-
launched-uk-ranked-amongst-donors-with-
strongest-commitment/ 
215 172 112 40.18% 58.60% 
/about/ 113 89 20 55.00% 30.97% 
/explore-the-data/global-view-of-hanci/ 77 67 4 50.00% 37.66% 
/explore-the-data/view-the-data/ 65 54 3 0.00% 29.23% 
/explore-the-data/research-findings/ 58 52 8 75.00% 37.93% 
/about/faq/ 38 30 2 100.00% 31.58% 
/community-voices/ 32 30 4 75.00% 43.75% 
Bounce rate % is lower than average, which is good. 
% Exit rate also good as visitors are still exploring site to learn more, therefore interested in content. 
Email news update 
An IDS email news update was sent out on 7 June with a round-up of nutrition news, 
including IDS website articles on HANCI and the new Lancet Nutrition Series. The email was 
sent to 19,300 addresses, of which 93 per cent were successfully sent, 22 per cent were 
open and 8 per cent clicked through to content on the IDS website. 
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Annex 2 Index indicators considered but not 
included 
Table A2.1 Indicators and reasons for exclusion from HANCI Donor 
Index 
Indicators Reason for exclusion from HANCI 
Donor Index 
1 The qualitative nature of donor–recipient 
relationships, in line with the Rome Principles. 
No quantifiable data available 
2 Disbursements and commitments towards the l’Aquila 
Food Security Initiative and the Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Programme 
These world’s largest multi-donor trust 
funds ended in 2012/13, to have 
insufficient continuity for inclusion in the 
HANCI Donor Index. Furthermore, part of 
these commitments is already counted in 
the ODA to agriculture and food security 
indicator. 
3 Fast-start finance (FSF) for climate change. 
During the Conference of the Parties (COP15) held in 
December 2009 in Copenhagen, developed countries 
pledged to provide new and additional resources, 
including forestry and investments, approaching $30 
billion for the period 2010–12 and with balanced 
allocation between mitigation and adaptation. 
FSF financing was pledged for 2010–12, 
but no further commitments have been 
made and only at the COP 2015 will new 
commitments be made for 2020. Hence, 
this indicator would have insufficient 
continuity for inclusion in HANCI. 
4 The extent of financial support to UNFCCC via the 
Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed 
Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund as a % of 
GNI 
This indicator was included in the HRCI 
2011 Donor Index. Since 2011, the OECD–
DAC provides estimates of ODA funding 
for mitigation as well as adaptation. This 
indicator is included in the HANCI Donor 
Index. The support for climate change 
funds is dropped to prevent double 
counting. 
5 Ratification of the UN ‘Fisheries Agreement’ for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. This treaty 
helps nations coordinate management of fish stocks 
that migrate or are in international waters. 
The treaty came into effect in 2001 and 
most rich countries have signed up to it, 
except for landlocked Switzerland and 
Austria, hence this indicator was 
abandoned in favour of the Agreement on 
Illegal Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing. 
6 The SUN signatory countries must demonstrate their 
commitment to scaling up nutrition by costing national 
nutrition plans by the end of 2012 (Spratt 2012). 
Not applicable to non-SUN countries 
7 Donors should explore and trial innovative financing 
to provide long-term, sustainable and predictable 
funding for the full nutrition package which is aligned 
with complementary initiatives in health, food security 
and agriculture (Spratt 2012). 
No data available – could be explored 
further in future HANCI editions 
(Cont’d.) 
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Table A2.1 (cont’d.) 
Indicators Reason for exclusion from HANCI 
Donor Index 
8 Countries contribute to developing a systematic, 
equitable and transparent mechanism for the sharing 
of costs between domestic and external sources so 
that countries receive adequate assistance in 
proportion to their needs (Spratt 2012). 
No secondary data available 
9 The level of fishing subsidies: it is widely 
acknowledged that global fisheries are 
overcapitalised, resulting in the depletion of fishery 
resources. The global community is paying the fishing 
industry billions in subsidies each year to continue 
fishing even when it would not be profitable otherwise 
– effectively funding the over-exploitation of marine 
resources (Rashid Sumaila et al. 2010). 
Data are not regularly collected, so no 
updates can be made over time, and data 
are already outdated (e.g. Roodman 
(2012) reports on 2007 subsidy levels, 
whereas Rashid Sumaila et al. (2010) 
report on 2003 levels). 
10 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. This 
initiative aims to increase domestic and foreign 
private investments in African agriculture, to enhance 
agricultural productivity, and reduce the risk borne by 
vulnerable economies and communities (UN 2012). 
This is chiefly an investment initiative by 
the private sector, with limited 
transparency and accountability to targeted 
beneficiaries (ONE 2012). 
11 Impute multilateral ODA to nutrition; climate change; 
social protection; agriculture and food security 
Technically possible (see, for example, 
Coppard and Zubairi 2011; Di Ciommo 
2013) though too laborious for our 
purposes. 
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Annex 3 Raw data all indicators (prior to normalisation) 
Table A3.1 Raw data 
 ODA to agriculture and 
food security as % of 
the fair share required 
ODA to social 
protection as % of the 
fair share required 
ODA to climate change 
as % of the fair share 
required 
ODA to agriculture and 
food security: 
endurance and 
stability 
Protection for 
domestic agricultural 
markets  
National climate 
change adaptation 
strategy/plan 
Biofuels mandates 
Australia 0.4783 0.1058 0.3963 5 8 3 1 
Austria 0.0982 0.0226 -0.7443 3 32 4 10 
Belgium 0.6288 0.0677 0.2610 7 35 3 10 
Canada 0.5892 0.0391 -0.5762 8 30 2 3.5 
Denmark 0.7197 0.0869 4.4737 4 37 4 10 
Finland 0.6115 0.0890 3.1815 8 29 4 10 
France 0.2151 0.0510 0.8266 3 33 4 10 
Germany 0.2585 0.0402 1.4088 3 34 4 10 
Greece 0.0194 0.0255 -0.9607 3 38 1 10 
Ireland 0.4901 0.2425 -0.4787 7 39 3 10 
Italy 0.0459 0.0230 -0.9236 4 31 1 10 
Japan 0.3636 0.0757 2.1202 5 122 1 3 
South Korea 0.0999 0.0072 -0.6310 6 117 4 2.5 
Luxembourg 1.0877 0.3687 -0.2682 8 37 1 10 
Netherlands 0.2880 0.0955 0.5974 2 27 4 10 
New Zealand 0.2476 0.0301 -0.3119 5 2 2 0 
Norway 1.3057 0.1157 7.6826 7 111 2 5 
Portugal 0.0267 0.0482 -0.7121 2 32 3 10 
Spain 0.4801 0.1218 0.5213 7 34 4 10 
Sweden 0.4764 0.0774 4.1322 3 29 2 10 
Switzerland 0.5082 0.0197 1.8658 5 87 3 0 
UK 0.2697 0.1231 0.2111 5 33 3 4.75 
USA 0.2804 0.0761 -0.9610 6 16 2 9.21 
(Cont’d.) 
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Table A3.1 (cont’d.) 
 Effected pledge on 
CO2 reductions 
Biodiversity protection ODA to nutrition: 
commitment vs. 
disbursement 
ODA to nutrition as % 
of the fair share 
required 
ODA to nutrition: 
endurance and 
stability 
ODA disbursements 
with gender policy 
objective 
Membership of Scaling 
Up Nutrition (SUN) 
movement 
Australia 0.0311 3.0000 -0.2131 0.5006 5 0.3820 0 
Austria 0.0056 3.6667 -0.2912 0.0560 4 0.1588 0.5 
Belgium 0.0235 3.3333 -0.0946 0.3384 6 0.3663 0.5 
Canada 0.2371 2.6667 0.0021 0.5933 5 0.3819 1 
Denmark 0.0140 3.3333 0.2732 0.8116 6 0.3566 1 
Finland 0.0077 4.0000 -0.2936 0.2689 4 0.3656 0.5 
France 0.0780 4.0000 -0.1818 0.1086 5 0.2361 1 
Germany 0.2412 3.3333 -0.4616 0.2015 7 0.4219 1 
Greece 0.0118 3.0000 0.3905 0.0127 2 0.4746 0.5 
Ireland 0.0042 4.0000 -0.2108 0.4092 5 0.3560 1 
Italy 0.0848 3.3333 0.0000 0.0213 5 0.2275 0.5 
Japan 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 0.1590 6 0.1074 1 
South Korea 0.0000 2.3333 -0.0517 0.0481 4 0.0622 0 
Luxembourg 0.0027 3.3333 -0.7419 2.0498 5 0.2270 0.5 
Netherlands 0.0254 3.6667 -0.6329 0.4505 6 0.1029 1 
New Zealand 0.0000 1.6667 0.0000 0.1948 4 0.6569 0 
Norway 0.0000 3.6667 0.1404 0.5036 6 0.2578 0 
Portugal 0.0057 3.3333 -0.0909 0.0072 5 0.0791 0.5 
Spain 0.0268 4.0000 0.0519 0.4720 5 0.2195 0.5 
Sweden 0.0022 3.6667 0.0000 0.3961 5 0.6010 1 
Switzerland 0.0000 4.0000 -0.0895 0.3564 3 0.1184 1 
UK 0.1381 4.0000 0.5709 0.4919 6 0.3873 1 
USA 0.0000 1.3333 -0.4292 0.0812 6 0.0453 1 
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